The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights by McDougal, Myers et al.
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters
1976
The Protection of Aliens from Discrimination and
World Public Order: Responsibility of States




New York Law School, lungchu.chen@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 70, Issue 3 ( July 1976), pp. 432-469
THE PROTECTION OF ALIENS FROM DISCRIMINATION
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES CONJOINED WITH HUMAN RIGHTS*
By Myres S. McDougal,** Harold D. Lasswell,*0
and Lung-chu Chen ****
The deprivations with which we are here concerned are those imposed
upon individuals on the ground that they do not possess the "nationality"
of the imposing state. By nationality we refer to the "characterizations"
states make of individuals for the purpose of controlling and protecting
them for the many comprehensive concerns of states., Since the larger
transnational community honors states in the conferment and withdrawal
of "nationality" upon many different grounds-including place of birth,
blood relation, subjective identification of individuals, and various ac-
tivities-these characterizations may bear little relation to the actual facts
of particular community membership and, hence, to reasonable differentia-
tions in terms of common interest in the larger community of mankind. It
is our thesis that most deprivations imposed through these characterizations
are made unlawful, not merely by the historic law of the responsibility of
states, but also by a newly emerged general norm of nondiscrimination
which seeks to forbid all generic differentiations among people in access
• This article is excerpted from a book, Huzr Rierrs AND WoRM PUBLIC OnDFM,
the authors have in progress. The authors gratefully acknowledge the criticism and
comments of Professor W. Michael Reisman. The Ralph E. Ogden Foundation has
been generous in its support of the studies from which this article is drawn.
Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School.
•** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social Sciences Emeritus, Yale Law
School.
•*** Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School.
'-The concept of "nationality" is often reified into a pseudoabsolute comparable to
"title," with considerable normative ambiguity. For an attempt at clarification, see
McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of the
Individual in External Arenas, 83 YArx L. J. 901 (1974), especially at 901-03, wherein
relevant references are indicated. It may be recalled that stateless persons are not
only aliens but may because of the lack of a protector be subjected to more severe
deprivations. See id. at 902, 960-62.
In her recent study, the Baroness Elles employs the term "alien" to designate "an
individual over whom a states [sic] has no jurisdiction, and no link exists between the
individual and the state except in so far as the individual may be within the territory
of that state." Elles, Aliens and Activities of the United Nations in the Field of
Human Rights, 7 HuMAN RIrGHTS J. 291, 296 (1974). This would appear inadequate
and confusing. The comprehensive and continuing claims states make about in-
dividuals under the concept of "nationality" are quite different from the occasional
and limited claims they make under the concept of "jurisdiction." The claims states
make in relation to aliens under "jurisdiction" are, furthermore, quite extensive, and
the "links" that may exist between an alien and a state may include much more than
residence. Cf. Nottebohm case, [1955] ICJ REP. 4.
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Deprivations imposed upon aliens extend far back in history and have
their roots deep in primitive suspicions and fears of the outsider. Dawson
and Head elaborate certain traditional perspectives:
Since ancient times foreigners have been regarded with suspicion, if
not fear, either due to their nonconforning religious and social cus-
toms, their assumed inferiority, or because they were considered po-
tential spies and agents of other nations. Thus, the Romans refused
aliens the benefits of the jus civile, thirteenth-century England limited
their recourse to the ordinary courts of justice, and imperial Spain
denied them trading rights in the New World.3
Even in the contemporary emerging world society, with its ever increasing
personal mobility and transnational interactions, the non-national is still
often assimilated with difficulty in the minutiae of the social processes of
particular communities.
Among a wide range of value deprivations still imposed upon aliens,
perhaps the most important is denial of full participation in the making
of conu-nunity decisions. In a world largely organized by nation-states,
differences in allegiance remain fundamental, and it is in the power process
that the sharpest distinctions are drawn between nationals and non-
nationals. Aliens are thus commonly denied access to voting and office-
holding (appointive and elective alike).4 They may be exempted from
"the rights incident to citizenship, such as military service, jury ser-
2 For detailed elaboration of the general norm of nondiscrimination, see McDougal,
Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom of Choice
and World Public Order, 24 Am. U. L. REv. 919, 1034-86 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as The Protection of Respect and Human Rights]; McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen,
Human Rights for Women and World Public Order: The Outlawing of Sex-Based
Discrimination, 69 AJIL 497 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Non-Conforming
Political Opinion and Human Rights: Transnational Protection Against Discrimination,
2 YALE STuDiES r4 WoRn PUBIuc OREi 1 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen,
The Human Rights of the Aged: An Application of the General Norm of Non-Dis-
crimination, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. No. 3 (Summer 1976, forthcoming); McDougal, Lass-
well, & Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging
Norm of Non-Discrimination, 74 MicH. L. REv. No. 5 (April 1976); McDougal, Lass-
well, & Chen, Freedom from Discrim;nation in Choice of Language and International
Human Rights, I So. ILL. U.L.J. 1151 (1976).
3 F. DAwSoN & I. HEAD, INrERNATiONAL LAW, NATIONAL TImuNALs AND THE RIGHTS
OF ALmENS xi (1971).
4 See E. BoRcHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CrriZENs ABROAD OR Tim LAw
oF INTERNATIONAL CLAris 63-64 (1922); A. FREFMAN, THE INrERNATiONAL RE-
SPONSIMIMY OF STATES FOR DE-.I-L OF JusTIcE 510-11 (1938).
In the United States, resident aliens, especially those who had formally declared
their intention to become U.S. citizens, were at one time permitted to vote in 22 states.
See M. KoNvrrz, THE ALImN AND T= ASLATIC N AsnaucmA LAw 180 (1946); Terrace
v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
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vice.. . ." r, Aliens are commonly subjected to rigorous registration require-
ments and to harsh restrictions in regard to freedom of movement, both
internally and transnationally. 6  Aliens may also be arbitrarily expelled.7
Aliens may be hampered, for various reasons, in obtaining effective remedy
for ordinary wrongs and may experience "denial of justice" 4--including
5 E. Borcm _r, supra note 4, at 63. See also W. DAvs, THE ENGLSH LA'w
RErATiNG TO ALIE S 184-210 (1931).
6 M. KoNvr-z, supra note 4, at 1-45. Cf. generally J. INcrs, STUnY OF DisdimsA-
TION IN RESPECT OF TE RIGHT OF EvEnYoNE TO LEAVE ANY CoUNTRY, INCLUDnG I-Is
OWN, AND TO BErTURN TO His COUNTRY, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.1 (1963).
7 See 6 A BRITISH DI cEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-241 (C. Parry ed. 1965);
E. BoncHmiD, supra note 4, at 48-63; I. BRowNLIE, PAINcipLES OF PuBtLc INTEr-
NATIONAL LAW 505-07 (2d ed. 1973); 3 G. H.ACEwORT, DIGEST or INTERNATIONAL
LAW 690-705 (1942); M. KoNvrrz, supra note 4, at 46-78; M. KoNvrrz, CrVL RIGHTS
IN IMMI1GRATION 93-131 (1953); 2 D. O'Co-ELI, INTERNATIONAL LAW 706-11 (2d
ed. 1970); 1 L. OPPENEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAw 691-95 (8th ed. 1I. Lauterpacht
ed. 1955); UNImD NATIONS, STny ON ExPULsIoN OF IfIRANTS (1955); P. WEIs,
NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 49-60 (1956); 1 M. WHn-
_mr, DAmAGEs IN INTmNATIONAL LAW 418-514 (1937); 8 M. WrIEmA, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 620-22, 850-63 (1967); Puente, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens
in Latin America, 36 AJIL 252, 257-70 (1942).
8 The concept of "denial of justice" is of course frequently used not primarily for
its factual reference but as a term of art to indicate a finding of state responsibility.
The same cases, and their discussion in the literature, do, however, illustrate the factual
deprivations imposed upon aliens. Sohn and Baxter seek to clarify this much-abused
concept in these words:
This term [denial of justice] has in the past been used in at least three different
senses. In its broadest sense, this term seems to embrace the whole field of State
responsibility, and has been applied to all types of wrongful conduct on the part
of the State toward aliens. In its narrowest sense, this term has been limited
to refusal of a State to grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of a court
to pronounce a judgment. In an intermediate sense, the expression "denial ofjustice" is employed in connection with the improper administration of civil and
criminal justice as regards an alien, including denial of access to courts, in-
adequate procedures, and unjust decisions. The last appears to be the most
apposite usage, since the term may thus be usefully employed to describe a par-
ticular type of international wrong for which no other adequate phrase exists in
the language of the law.
F. GAI=cIA-AmADoto, L. SonN, & R. BAxrE, RECENT CODIFICATION OF TnE LAW or
STATE RESPONSmLITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 180 (1974). This book reproduces,
in the first half, the draft articles on "Responsibility of the State for Injuries Caused
in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens" and commentary thereon, with
some minor changes, as excerpted from the six reports submitted by F. V. Garcia-
Amador to the International Law Commission during the period 1956-1961 in his
capacity as the Special Rapporteur on the subject of "State Responsibility." These
six Reports are: First Report, [1956] 2 Y.B. IrriL L. Coam'Nr 173-231, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/96 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Garcia-Amador's First Report]; Second Report,
[1957] 2 Y.B. INr'rL L. Com'N 104-30, UN Doc. A/CN.4/106 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Garcia-Amador's Second Report]; Third Report, [1958] 2 Y.B. INTL'. L. COMIs'N
47-73, UN Doc. A/CN.4/111 (1958); Fourth Report, [1959] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMI'N
1-36, UN Doc. A/CN.4/119 (1959); Fifth Report, [1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMm'N 41-
68, UN Doc. A/CN.4/125 (1960); Sixth Report, [1961] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N -44,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/134 and Add. 1 (1961). In the second half, the book reproduces
the "Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens"




subjection to arbitrary arrest and detention, denial of access to appropriate
tribunals, judicial or administrative, denial of fair hearing, and subjection
to arbitrary decisions.9
Characteristic deprivations in the wealth process are scarcely less severe.
Aliens may be restricted in the acquisition of land and other forms of
property.10 "The right to acquire immovables," wrote Borchard, "by pur-
chase or descent, and to own and dispose of them may be forbidden to
aliens." - Similarly, onerous restrictions may be imposed on "the property
rights of aliens in certain national resources, e.g., national vessels, national
mines, and other kinds of property." 12 Aliens may be forbidden to engage
in enumerated business enterprises. The wealth of aliens may be ex-
propriated without adequate compensation; 13 movement of their assets may
On denial of justice, see generally 1. BROWNLmE, supra note 7, at 514-16; A. FarE-
mAN, note 4 supra; 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CmIEFLY As INTEPRETED AND
APPLIED BY TIE UNITED STATES 909-17 (1945); 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 7, at
945-50; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF TmE UNrrED STATES
502-03, 534-48 (1965) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEMENT]: De Arechaga, Inter-
national Responsibility, in MANUAL OF PuLic INTERNATIONAL LAw 531, 553-57 (M.
Sorensen ed. 1968); Eagleton, Denial of Justice in International Law, 22 AJIL 538
(1928); Fitzmaurice, The Meaning of the Term "Denial of justice," 13 B. Y. INT'L L.
93 (1932); Spiegel, Origin and Development of Denial of Justice, 32 AJIL 63 (1938).
9Cf. F. DAwsON & I. HEAD, note 3 supra; A. FREEmAN, note 4 supra; F. GARCrA-
AMADOR, L. Somi & R. BAxTER, supra note 8, at 179-99; 2 C. HYDE, supra note 8, at
924-36.10 See E. BoRcaARD, supra note 4, at 87; 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIrGRA-
TION LAW AND PROCEDURE 1-122.1-1-123 (rev. ed. 1975); M. KoNvrrz, sipra note 4,
at 148-52; McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 61 (1947);
Sullivan, Alien Land Laws: A Re-Evaluation, 36 TEMP. L. Q. 15 (1962).
The Mexican laws regarding aliens' rights to acquire real property are described as
'lush, barren, cragged, flat, solemn, capricious, gnarled, slashed, smoothed and
painted...." Quoted in Comment, Do We Live in Alien Nations?, 3 CALIF. WESTERPN
INT'L L. J. 75, 83 (1972). For more details, see id. at 83-94.
For charts showing limitations on the acquisition of land imposed on aliens (in-
dividuals and corporations) by various states of the United States, see id. at 95-111.
1l E. BORCHARD, supra note 4, at 86.
12Id. at 91.
13 For comprehensive reference, see Weston, International Law and the Deprivation
of Foreign Wealth: A Framework for Future Inquiry, in 2 THE FUTURE OF T=E INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 36-182 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1970). Cf. generally
K. CARLSTON, LAw AND ORGANIZATION IN WORLD SOCETY (1962); ESSAYS ON Ex-
PROPRIATION (R. Miller & R. Stanger eds. 1967); A. FATOuRos, GoVERNMENT GUAIIAN-
TEES TO FOREIGN INVESTORS (1962); I. FOIGmL, NATIONALIZATION AND COMPENSATION
(1964); W. FaEDMANN, EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1953); R. LmmCw,
THE PRoTECTIoN OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1965); R. LTaLCE, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
POSTWAR BrsuH PRACrIGE (1967); E. MOONEY, FOREIGN SE=URES-SARBBATNO AND
THE AcT OF STATE DOCTRINE (1967); RIGHTS AN DuTIEs oF PRavATE INVESTORS
ABROAD (International and Comparative Law Center, The Southwestern Legal Founda-
tion ed. 1965); SELECTED READINGS ON PROTECTION BY LAw OF PRIvATE FOREIGN IN-
VESTMENs (International and Comparative Law Center, The Southwestern Legal
Foundation ed. 1964); H. STEnE & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
408-91 (2d ed. 1976); THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (vols. 1-3) (R. Lillich ed. 1972-75); B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS:
PosTw.-a FRENcH PRACTICE (1971); G. W=ITE, NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN
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be curtailed. They may even be prohibited from gainful employment, and
be condemned therefore to lead a precarious existence. 4 Aliens may fur-
ther be excluded from enjoying such welfare benefits as "relief, public
works, public housing, old-age assistance." '15 Closely allied deprivations
relate to the exercise of professional skills, as when aliens are excluded
from a wide range of professions and occupations, including the practice
of law, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, public accounting, architecture, and
teaching.-1
When handicapped by a different mother tongue, aliens may enjoy
limited opportunities for education, and financial aid and other assistance
may be withheld. Opportunities to shape enlightenment by owning and
editing mass media of communication are generally restricted. Aliens
may be prevented from marrying nationals because of the inhibiting con-
PRoPE RTY (1961); B. WORTLEY, ExpnaO =UArON IN PUBLmC Irw=NATioNAL LAtw
(1959); Dawson & Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of
Compensation, 30 FORDAAM L. REv. 727 (1962); Lowenfeld, Reflections on Expropria-
tion and the Future of Investment in the Americas, 7 Iht'L LAWvYER 116 (1973); MANN,
Outlines of a History of Expropriation, 75 L. Q. lEv. 188 (1959); Metzger, Property
in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 594 (1964); Nationalization, 14 HAIIv. INT'L L. J.
378 (1973).
34As Borcbard wrote: "The labor of aliens is the only exchangeable commodity
they possess. To deprive them of the right to labor is to consign them to starvation."
E. BoRcHAnD, supra note 4, at 186. "An alien cannot live," he added, "where he can-
not work:' Id. at 187.
Cf. W. GxBsoN, A.ImEs Am m LAw 119-43 (1940); Das, Discrimination in Em-
ployment against Aliens-The Impact of the Constitution and Federal Civil Rights
Laws, 35 U. Prrr. L. RlEv. 499 (1974); Comment, Equal Protection and Supremacy
Clause Limitations on State Legislation Restricting Aliens, 1970 UTAH L. Rlv. 136;
Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 CoLUm. L. REv.
1012 (1957); Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
1971 Dvmx L. J. 583 [hereinafter cited as Note on Protection of Alien Rights].
15E. BORCHARD, supra note 4, at 186. See also UNrrzn NATos, STuY ON AssisT-
ANCE TO ImDiGENT AUEs, UN Doc. ST/SOA/7 (1951); Note, State Discrimination
against Mexican Aliens, 38 GEO WAsH. L. REv. 1091 (1970).
1 For a lengthy itemization of occupations that were once denied aliens in the
United States, see M. KoNvrz, supra note 4, at 190-211. Cf. E. BoRcHARM, supra note
4, at 80; 1 C. GORDON & H. RosENFm, supra note 10, at 1-118-1-120; Branse,
State Laws Barring Aliens from Professions and Occupations, 3 INS Mornmy Rrv. 281
(March 1946); Cliffe, Aliens: The Unconstitutional Classification for Admission to the
Bar, 4 ST. MARY's L. J. 181 (1972); Sanders, Aliens in Professions and Occupations-
State Laws Restricting Participation, 16 IN REPoRTEn 37 (1968); Comment, Constitu-
tional Protection of Aliens, 40 Thm,. L. REv. 235, 245--53 (1973).
Within the United States, community expectations and practices appear to be chang-
ing more favorably towards aliens. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Gordon,
The Alien and the Constitution, 9 Ca=. WESTEn L. REv. 1 (1972); Miller & Steele,
Aliens and the Federal Government: A Newer Equal Protection, in ImnIRATIOx,
ALIEAGE AN NATI moN T 1-31 (1975) (UCD L. RIv. vol. 8); Note on Protection
of Alien Rights, supra note 14; Recent Decisions-Constitutional Law--Rights of Aliens
-Citizenship as a Requirement for Admission to the Bar is a Violation of Equal Pro-
tection, 4 GA. J. Ir'x & Comp. L. 206 (1974).
Cf. also Christol & Bader, Legal Rights of the Alien in Austria with Special Refer-
ence to the United States Citizen, 7 INT'L LAw=m 289 (1973).
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sequences of involuntary acquisition or loss of nationality,1 and are there-
fore handicapped in the shaping and sharing of affection. In some states,
the rights of non-nationals in adoption and guardianship are curtailed.18
The access of aliens to health facilities and services is generally less than
that of nationals, and housing often presents difficult problems. Even the
lives of aliens may be threatened by mob actions, inspired by xenophobia;
and in many communities alienage remains a stigma of disrespect, affecting
many civil liberties.19
II.
BAsi Com umrr" Po cns
In a global society aspiring towards the utmost freedom of choice for
individuals in matters of group affiliation, residence, movement, access to
value processes, and so on, differentiation upon the ground of alienage is
scarcely less invidious to human dignity values than discrimination based
upon race, sex, and religion.20 A unique feature of deprivations imposed
upon the ground of alienage is, further, that they commonly involve high
degrees of transnational impact. The reference of the generic label "aliens"
is not to some static isolated group, but potentially to the whole of human-
ity. Every individual is a potential alien in relation to all the states of
which he is not a national; to the extent that he moves and engages in
17 See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 1, at 922-23, 939-40, 973-74. See
also UNrrm NATIONS, NATIONALITY oF MAnRImD WOMEN (1963); UNrrED NATIONS,
CoNVNTION ON Tvn NATIONALI OF MARRIED WOMEN (1962); W. WA.TZ, TE
NATIONALITY OF MARREED WoMMN (1937). is E. BoncHArw, supra note 4, at 91.
1 9 In the words of Dunn:
... the simple fact that he is a foreigner may often be a determining factor in
the kind of treatment he receives at the hands of private individuals or govern-
ment officials. Prejudice against aliens as such is still a pervasive trait of human
nature.
F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS 36 (1932).
It may be noted that the vulnerability of the alien to severe deprivations in the host
community is, of course, particularly acute at a time of high crisis, as exemplified by
the extremely harsh treatment accorded "enemy aliens." The treatment of enemy aliens
raises very special policy problems in relation to state security, which cannot be dealt
with in this article. See M. DomEE, THE CONTROL OF AxiEN PROPERTY (1947);
M. Do~m, TRADING wrr THE EN m IN WORLu WAR H (1943); F. LArE, Tim
INTERNmENT OF ALmNS (1940); M. McDouGAL & F. FELICIAo, LAw AND MmIN
WORLD PULuc ORDER 89-91 (1961); 2 D. O'CoNNELL, supra note 7, at 769-73;
S. RU IN, PIVATE FonFIcN INv Ers~ers 57 Er SEQ. (1956); Borchard, The Treatment
of Enemy Property, 34 GEo. L. J. 389 (1946); CAnLSTON; Return of Enemy Property,
52 ASIL Paoc. 53 (1958); Jessup, Enemy Property, 49 AJIL 57 (1955); Sommerich,
A Brief against Con scation, 11 LAw & CoNTsm~s. PoB. 152 (1945).
20 See note 2 supra.
The United States Supreme Court, in outlawing state statutes denying welfare benefits
to aliens, declared in Graham v. Richardson that
classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are
inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a class are
a prime example of a discrete and insular' minority... for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate.
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
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activities across state boundaries, this potentiality becomes an actuality.
It was with deep insight that many years ago Dunn characterized the
problem of such deprivations as "an intricate and continuing international"
one "ultimately concerned with the possibility of maintaining a unified
economic and social order for the conduct of international trade and inter-
course among independent political units of diverse cultures and stages of
civilization, different legal and economic systems, and varying degrees of
physical power and prestige." 21
It must be conceded that the aggregate common interest of territorially
organized communities may upon occasion require some limitation of this
preferred policy of the utmost individual freedom of choice in state mem-
bership and complete equality in the treatment of aliens and nationals.
Insofar as the characterizations of "nationality" made by states bear some
rational relation to group memberships in fact, it may be expedient for
states to make appropriate differentiations for the sake of internal and ex-
ternal security and the optimal functioning of all internal value processes. 22
The perspective of human dignity requires that concessions to the organ-
ized interests of territorial communities should, however, be kept to a
minimum. The more important differential treatments that may be held
permissible upon grounds of alienage would appear to be confined to those
that relate to participation in the making of community decisions (voting
and office-holding). In longer-term perspective, as increasing interactions
build more pluralized and regional territorial structures for the world,
accompanied by the attrition of anachronistic national barriers, even such
residual concessions to territoriality would presumably become functionless
and unnecessary.
As a guide to the task of distinguishing deprivations imposed upon aliens
that are rationally related to common interest and therefore permissible
from those that are impermissible, Dunn proposed a formulation in terms
of allocation of risk. He affirmed that "a workable test can only be arrived
at by giving consideration to the general purpose of the notion of inter-
national responsibility in connection with injuries to foreigners" and found
that purpose in maintenance of "the minimum conditions which are re-
garded as necessary for the continuance of international trade and inter-
course." 23 "Normal business and social relationships" 24 were capable of
bearing a certain degree of risk of "abuses of governmental power by in-
dividual officials and employees," 25 but there was a point beyond which,
Dunn found, such relationships could not carry on. Hence, he concluded,
the appropriate question is:
... does the delinquency of a particular official indicate a failure on
the part of the state to establish governmental organs capable of main-
taining the minimum conditions necessary for the carrying on of
21 F. DuNN, supra note 19, at 1.
22 Cf. McDouga, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 1, at 903-05.




normal social and business relations? If it does, then the state assumes
the risk, otherwise not. Or the question might be put in another way.
Is the delinquency of a type which, if permitted to occur generally,
would make the conduct of customary social and business relations
impossible? One might express this in familiar language by saying
that a state is "under a duty" to provide conditions of this character,
and that if it fails in this duty, then it becomes liable to make repara-
tion.26
The difficulty with this test, whether confined to deprivations related to
abuses of official power or extended to all legislative differentiation of
aliens, is that it offers no detailed criteria for the allocation of risk or for
evaluating costs and benefits in terms of the value consequences of differ-
ent options in decision. When proffered and applied without guiding
criteria the concept of "risk allocation" is no more than a tautologous,
question-begging formula. There would appear no rational escape in rela-
tion to the problems of aliens, as of other problems, from the necessity of
an explicit postulation of goals and a careful contextual analysis, with re-
spect to every particular problem, of the inclusive interests of the larger
community in a world society, the exclusive interests of the particular ter-
ritorial communities in protecting their internal integrity or their nationals,
and the interests of individual human beings in all basic rights.
The more fundamental policies which should be postulated, and made
to infuse all decisions, for appraisal of particular instances of differentiation
between aliens and nationals are of course those embodied in the con-
temporary human rights prescriptions, designed to reflect the common
interests of the peoples of the world as individuals. 27 The fact of alienage
does not change the fundamental demands and interests of the individual
as a human being; its only relevance must be to the organized interests of
a territorial community which, in varying contexts, his activities may affect.
It is widely recognized today that many, if not most, "national" boundaries
are highly artificial and anachronistic from any functional perspective, im-
peding a rational regional organization of the world, and, as suggested
above, that the grounds commonly employed by states in making their
characterizations of "nationality" may bear only an accidental relation to
the facts of community membership. 28 In this context, the necessities of
an aggregate common interest in a global economy and society, requiring
a more rational relation of peoples to resources, should be made to yield as
little as possible to the demands and practices of an outmoded and destruc-
tive nationalism. A clear consciousness of interdependence offers more
hope even for shared exclusive interests than the amnesia of parochialism.2
26Id. at 134.
27 See notes 93-132 infra and accompanying text.
2 See McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, note 1 supra. The imposition of deprivations
by such a flexible group label may reflect the utmost arbitrariness.
9 Cf. id. at 901-05, 993-98; F. DuNi, supra note 19.
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II.
TNEms iN DEcIsioN
In ancient times the alien was commonly looked upon as an enemy and
hence treated as an outlaw; 1o parochial community expectations kept him
powerless and unprotected. As the Roman empire expanded, aliens were
gradually accorded protection under the jus gentium, a law made appli-
cable to foreigners as well as citizens, as distinguished from the Jus civile
which applied exclusively to Roman citizens.8 ' The earlier harsh treatment
of aliens was further, theoretically at least, ameliorated with the spread of
the Christian idea of the unity of mankind.a2 In the feudal period, "the
disabilities of the alien became more clearly defined," though such "dis-
abilities and restrictions differed in degree in different baronies." 31 In the
words of Dawson and Head:
In the early Middle Ages international commerce was so structured
that few people lived abroad. Those persons that did had few real
rights. In some places they could be treated as serfs and almost every-
where they could not pass property by inheritance. As trade and com-
merce expanded in the later Middle Ages, the position of foreigners
improved, mostly due to increased protection given them by more
powerful central governments against local feudal lords, and only quite
incidentally to international agreement.'
With the coming of the modern nation-state system, a more humanitarian
attitude toward aliens began to develop. The founding fathers of con-
temporary international law asserted that all persons, alien or other, were
entitled to certain natural rights. Francisco de Vitoria was among the first
to emphasize the importance of according aliens fair treatment. 8 Taking
for granted the right of free access to territorial communities, Grotius
considered it "essential to make the status of the foreigner coincide as far
as possible with that of the subject of the particular State." 16 It was
30 In the words of Goebel:
Very clearly, in the earliest times, the alien, as a clanless individual or outlaw,
was without any of the existing personal rights. He had no "wergeld," he
was not entitled to the peace and protection of the locality, and if by chance he
enjoyed even liberty of person it was only by sufferance and in amelioration of
the harsh laws which gave the local lord title over his person, as ferae naturae.
How long these practices survived, we cannot say, but certainly the growth of
a Gastrecht so common among primitive peoples was not long in superseding the
ancient customs. This Gastrecht, or rights of hospitality, gave a certain quantum
of protection to the foreigner and was exercised more particularly as a form of
patronage of a lord over aliens.
Goebel, The International Responsibility of States for Injuries Sustained by Aliens on
Account of Mob Violence, Insurrection and Civil Wars, 8 AJIL 802, 803 (1914).
81 E. BoncHARD, supra note 4, at 33; A. R=O, THE MiNIMum SrA sDAis o INT, R-
NATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS 25--26 (1949); Head, The Stranger in Our Midst:
A Sketch of the Legal Status of the Alien in Canada, 2 CANADIAN Y. B. INT'L L. 107,
108 (1964). 32 See A. RoiTr, supra note 31, at 26.
83 E. BORCHARD, supra note 4, at 34.
s" F. DAwsoN & I. HEAD, supra note 3, at 1.
85 A. ROT, supra note 31, at 27.
86 Id. at 28. Cf. F. DuNN, supra note 19, at 46-48.
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Vattel, however, who first expounded a coherent and influential doctrine
for the protection of aliens. 7 Writing more than a century after Grotius,
as mercantilism was being transformed into modem capitalism and as a
vast European expansion overseas was beginning, Vattel created the theo-
retical basis for much subsequent decision. Viewing the state as an entity
composed of the sovereign and his citizens, Vattel stressed that the state
had a right to protect its citizens, wherever they might be. An injury to
an individual alien was asserted to be an injury to the state of his nation-
ality. In Vattel's words:
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must
protect that citizen. The sovereign of the injured citizen must avenge
the deed and, if possible, force the aggressor to give full satisfaction or
punish him, since otherwise the citizen will not obtain the chief end of
civil society, which is protection . 8
Ever since Vattel, and accompanying the spread of industrialization and
European culture throughout the world, there has developed a unique
customary international law for the special protection of aliens, built upon
decisions from foreign office to foreign office, and in international and
national tribunals, and fortified by the opinions of publicists and a vast net-
work of relatively uniform treaties of "friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion." ' The identification Vattel makes of the interests of the state and
s 3 E. DE VATrEL, CLAssIcs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE LAW OF NATIONS OR
THE PmNciLrs oF NATURA. LAw (C. Fenwick transl. 1916). The book was first
published in 1758. Cf. P. Rmc, THE PosrmoN OF THE INDIviDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW ACCORDING TO Gnorus AND VA rL (1960).
8 3 E. DE VAS-rEL, supra note 37, at 136.
Vatters doctrine was quite precisely formulated by the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway case:
[Iln taking up the case of one of its nationals, by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality asserting its
own right, the right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect for the rules of
international law. This right is necessarily limited to the intervention on behalf of
its own nationals because, in the absence of a special agreement, it is the bond of
nationality between the state and the individual which alone confers upon the
state the right of diplomatic protection, and it is as a part of the function of
diplomatic protection that the right to take up a claim and to ensure respect for
the rules of international law must be envisaged. Where the injury was done to
the national of some other State no claim to which such injury may give rise falls
within the scope of the diplomatic protection which a State is entitled to afford
nor can it give rise to a claim which that State is entitled to espouse.
[19391 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 76, at 16.
39 On the international law of state responsibility, see generally C. AMERASiNGHE,
STATE REsPoNsmLrTY FOR INJUIES TO ALIENS (1967); W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL
LAw: CASES AND MA~mALS 742-899 (3d ed. 1971); E. BoncHAuw, note 4 supra;
J. BsaEnLy, THE LAw OF NATIONS 276-91 (6th ed. H. Waldock ed. 1963); THE LAW OF
NATONS 601-747 (H. Briggs ed. 2d ed. 1952) [hereinafter cited as H. BRiGas];
L BnOwNLIE, supra note 7, at 418--581; B. CrENe, GENERAr PaNnci'ras OF LAw As
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL CoURTs AND TsnuN'Ais 161-253 (1953); F. DAWSON &
i HEAD, note 3 supra; C. DE VIsscmR, THEORY AND REALrrY IN PuBLIC INrEa-
NATIONAL LAw 277-94 (P. Corbett transl. 1968); F. DUNN, note 19 supra; A. FREE-
MAN, note 4 supra; C. EAGLETON, TnE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1928); W. FASEDmANN, 0. LIssN, & R. PuGE, CASES AND MATERItA ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw 745-879 (1969); F. GAIciA-AmADOn, L. SomN, & R. BA XTE, note
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of the alien individual has often been criticized as "fiction," as in some
contexts it obviously is.4° Like other "fictions feigned," however, this
identification of state and individual interests has been found, by dis-
interested observers as well as by claimant parties, to represent in many
contexts a close approximation to social reality. People always have been,
and remain, important bases of power for territorial communities. 41  The
security, in the sense of a minimum freedom from external violence and
coercion, and the optimum order or quality of society, in the sense of the
greater production and wider sharing of all values that any community can
achieve, are intimately dependent upon the numbers and characteristics of
its members, including their skldls, capabilities, and loyalties. The con-
ferring of a competence upon particular states to protect their members
8 supra; INTERNATiONAL LAW 3N TER TwE~rwrmrH CEN'tmy 481-585 (L. Gross ed.
1969) [hereinafter cited as L. GRoss]; W. HOLDER & G. BmNNAN, THE INTERNAIONAL
LEGAL SYsTEM: CASES AND MATERtAS 629-709 (1972); P. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS 94-122 (1968); C. JOSEPH, NATIONALITY AND Di'LomATic PnomcrnoN: Tim
Co moNwEALTH OF NATIONS (1969); M. KATz & K. BREwsTm, THE LAw OF 1nmm-
NATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERALS 6-398 (1960);
N. LxEE, C. OLVER, & J. SwEENEY, CAsES AND MATEuALS oN THE INTEmATiONAL
LEcAL Sysmmr~ 572-655 (1973); R. Lrucl, INTERNATIONAL ChAims: Timm ADJuDICA-
TION BY NATIONAL COMMISSIONS (1962); R. LrujcH & G. CmuSTENSON, INTER-
NATrONAL CLAMS: THEm PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION (1962); 6 J. MoorE, A
DIcEST OF INTERNATrONAL LAw 605-1037 (1906); 2 D. O'CoNmNEr, supra note 7, at
693-719, 941-1025; 1. L. OPPENHfE, supra note 7, at 335-69; RESTATE MENT, supra
note 8, at 497-633; A. RoTm, note 31 supra; H. Samua & D. VACTS, supra note 13,
at 357-530; G. TuNmN, THEORY OF ITr.ERNATiONAL LAw 381-425 (W. Butler transl.
1974); Borchard, Diplomatic Protection, 5 ENCYC. SoC. ScIENcEs 153 (1931); CopI-
thorne, State Responsibility and International Claims, in CANADrAN PERSPECTVES ON
IrRNATnoNAL LAw AND ORGANIZATION 207-28 (R. MacDonald, G. Morris, & D.
Johnston eds. 1974); De Arechaga, note 8 supra; Garcia-Amador, State Responsibilityj-
Some New Problems, 94 HAcuE REcuIm DES Couns 365 (1958); Harvard Research
in International Law, The Law of Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their
Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 AJIL Supp. 131 (1929); Sweeney,
The Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and the Responsi-
bility of States for Injury to Aliens, 16 SYRACUsE L. REv. 762 (1965).
For the work of the International Law Commission in regard to state responsibility,
see Garcia-Amador's six Reports, note 8 supra, and Ago's Reports, note 92 infra.
4 'See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 1, at 906-18; Koessler, Govern-
ment Espousal of Private Claims before International Tribunals, 13 U. Cr-. L. REV. 180
(1945).
41As Dunn incisively observed:
We think of the United States as an organized group of individuals occupying a
particular spot of the earth's surface. Yet at any given moment, a vast number
holding membership in that group are scattered all over the world, and an equally
vast amount of their property, both real and personal, is situated in foreign juris-
dictions. The same is true of all the other civilized nations of the world. Again,
we conceive of the United States as a single economic unit. Yet if we trace the
essential threads of that complicated fabric we find a surprisingly large propor-
tion of them leading beyond the boundaries of the country to all parts of the
world. If for any reason those threads should be cut, the effect upon the daily
lives of all of us would be profound.
Dunn, International Law and Private Property Rights, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 166, 170
(1928).
See also McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 1, at 901-05.
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from injuries abroad may, thus, in a relatively unorganized world serve in
many contexts to protect both the interests of the state in an important
base of power and the interests of the alien individual in his basic human
rights. In appropriate tribute, Judge Jessup describes the "history of this
branch of international law during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" 4 2
as exemplifying "the way in which a body of customary international law
develops in response to the need for adjustment of clashing interests." 4 3
He adds that it "is remarkable that in this struggle which so generally in-
volved the relations between the strong and the weak, international law,
for all its primitiveness, developed as a balance for conflicting interests," ,4
and concludes that, "in terms of the modernization of international law:" 45
The function of the law of responsibility of states for injuries to aliens
... is to provide in the general world interest, adequate protection for
the stranger, to the end that travel, trade, and intercourse may befacilitated .46
Within the broad, historic development of this unique customary inter-
national law for the protection of aliens, two different standards about the
responsibility of states, both of which purport to include a norm prohibit-
ing discrimination against aliens, have competed for general community
acceptance. One of these standards is described as the doctrine of "na-
tional treatment" or "equality of treatment" and provides that aliens should
receive equal, and only equal, treatment with nationals. 47 The second
standard is described as that of a "minimum international standard" and
specifies that, however a state may treat its nationals, there are certain
minima in humane treatment that cannot be violated in relation to aliens.""
A review of the flow of decision and communication in development of
the customary law about aliens, and especially in the recent, more general
prescriptions about human rights, will establish, it is believed, that the
42 P. JEssup, supra note 39, at 95. 4Ibid.
44 Id. at 96. 45 Id. at 105.
46 Ibid.
The observation of Dunn is equally illuminating:
From a practical point of view, the foreigner, although he may be accorded full
civil rights on the same basis as citizens, is often at a disadvantage in any dispute
which he may have with the agents of the state of his sojourn merely by reason
of the fact that he is a foreigner. Furthermore, being deprived of political rights
outside of his own country, he is not at liberty to participate in the determination
of the social and economic order and has not the political means for the pro-
tection of his interests that are at the disposal of the citizen. Perhaps for these
reasons as much as any other, it has been found necessary, in a world of diverse
cultures and heterogeneous peoples, of strong governments and weak governments,
of orderly countries and disorderly countries, to work out a common code of
treatment of aliens in order that there might be some basis of security and
predictability upon which to build the present complex structure of international
intercourse.
Dunn, supra note 41, at 174.
47 See notes 50-58 infra and accompanying text.
49 For an excellent historical account, see Borchard, The Minimum Standard of the
Treatment of Aliens, 38 MIc.m L. REv. 445 (1940). For other discussions and doc-
umentation, see notes 59-82 infra and accompanying text.
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second of these standards has become present general community expecta-
tion.49
It is seldom seriously asserted that states cannot differentiate between
nationals and aliens in ways that bear a reasonable relation to the differ-
ences in their obligations and loyalties. Thus, states reciprocally honor
each other in accepting the lawfulness of a great variety of differentiations
in permissible access to territory, participation in government, the owner-
ship of important natural resources, and so on. Yet the principle would
appear almost universally accepted that with respect to participation in
many important social processes states cannot discriminate against aliens
in favor of nationals in ways that have no substantial basis in the differ-
ences in their obligations and loyalties.50 Even the Latin American states
are described as having laid "claim to a peculiar virtue in placing the alien
on a footing of civil equality with the national;" r" these states in fact
exhibit a long history of constitutional and statutory enactment directed
toward this end."2 The perversion of this important general norm of non-
discrimination has come, as Secretary of State Hull once pointed out,
in taling a principle designed for the protection against inhumane treat-
ment of the individual alien and transforming it into a formula designed
to protect states from responsibility for arbitrary actionA8  One formula-
tion of the "national treatment" doctrine propounded by many Latin
Americans, and occasionally by others, is that an alien cannot expect a
higher standard of treatment than a national, and hence a state cannot
be held responsible under international law for any injury or damage
suffered by an alien if he has been accorded the same treatment as na-
tionals. ,  Thus, in the words of a leading proponent, Carlos Calvo:
Aliens who established themselves in a country are certainly entitled
to the same rights of protection as nationals, but they cannot claim
any greater measure of protection.2
49See notes 48-139 infra and accompanying text.
GO Nondiscrimination is a principal objective of the treaties of friendship, commerce,
and navigation. See R. WsoN, UNIT= STATES COMMEcIAL ThEATres AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 6 (1960).
In its Restatement of Foreign Relations Lawv (§166), the American Law Institute
characterizes "Discrimination against Alien" in these terms:
(1) Conduct, attributable to a state and causing injury to an alien, that dis-
criminates against aliens generally, against aliens of his nationality, or against him
because he is an alien, departs from the international standard of justice specified
in §165.
(2) Conduct discriminates against an alien within the meaning of Subsection
1) if it involves treating the alien differently from nationals or from aliens of a
different nationality without a reasonable basis for the difference.
R TATEm rNT, supra note 8, at 507-08. 61 Borchard, supra note 47, at 55.52 F. DA WsoN & I. HEAD, supra note 3, at 7.
53 3 G. HACKWORTE, supra note 7, at 658-60.
5The history of the standard of national treatment is well presented in Garcia-
Amador's First Reiiort, supra note 8, at 201-02; F. GAncrA-AmADoR, L. Sore, &
R. BA Tm supra note 8, at 3-4.
r5 6 C. CALvo, LE: Dorr INTEaNAToNAL 231 (5th ed. 1885), quoted in Garcia-
Amador's First Report, supra note 8, at 201.
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This formulation by Calvo was officially adopted by the First Inter-
national Conference of American States held in Washington, 1889-1890:
1. Foreigners are entitled to enjoy all the civil rights enjoyed by
natives; and they shall be afforded all the benefits of said rights in all
that is essential as well as in the form or procedure, and the legal
remedies incident thereto, absolutely in like manner as said natives.
2. A nation has not, nor recognizes in favor of foreigners, any other
obligations or responsibilities than those which in favor of the natives
are established, in like cases, by the constitution and the laws.56
Similarly, the Convention on Rights and Duties of States, adopted in 1933
at the Seventh International Conference of American States held in
Montevideo, proclaimed in Article 9:
The jurisdiction of states within the limits of national territory applies
to all the inhabitants.
Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law and
the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other
or more extensive than those of the nationals.5 7
A comparable position has often been reiterated by Latin American states-
men and publicists1s
It scarcely requires argument that a principle of "national treatment"
so specified, though it does not entirely repudiate international law, must
leave aliens largely at the mercies of their host state. Such an interpreta-
tion of international law would, in Brierly's words, "make each state the
judge of the standard required by international law and would virtually
deprive aliens of the protection of their own state altogether." 59 In a world
in which many states are tyrannical or totalitarian or otherwise oppressive
such an outcome is not to be desired nor lightly accepted. The absurdity
inherent in such an interpretation of international law was eloquently in-
dicated by Secretary of State Hull: "It is contended, in a word, that it is
wholly justifiable to deprive an individual of his rights if all other persons
are equally deprived, and if no victim is allowed to escape." 80 It is diffi-
cult not to accept the conclusion of Sohn and Baxter that
to a large extent the doctrine espousing the "national treatment" stand-
ard is merely a reflection of a fundamental hostility on the part of some
nations to the idea of accountability of States for asserted violations of
the rights of aliens. 61
rs Tim INTmwATiONAL CoNF , ENcs oF AmEuCAN STATES, 1889 to 1928, at 45
(J. Scott ed. 1931).
5
7THE INTERNAIONAL CONFERENCES oF AmECAN STATES, Fhts Su PLEmEN,
1933-1940, at 122 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ed. 1940).
88 See Garcia-Amador's First Report, supra note 8, at 201-02; A. RovIr, supra note
31, at 62-80; 1. BRtowNLm, supra note 7, at 509-10; W. GiasoN, supra note 14, at
19-44.
59 J. BRamRLY, supra note 39, at 278-79.
60 3 G. HAcKwomi, supra note 7, at 659.
61 F. GAnciL-AMADoa, L. SoNr, & R. BAxrEn, supra note 8, at 158. Similarly, in
the words of Goebel:
The Latin American states have shown considerable ingenuity in devising schemes
to avoid liability for injuries to aliens. But to all appearances these have been
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The doctrine of a "minimum international standard," in sharp contradic-
tion to that of "national treatment," insists that a state cannot escape re-
sponsibility for the inhumane treatment of aliens by the allegation that it
treats its own nationals likewise. This widely and long-accepted doc-
trine prescribes that there is a minimum common standard in relation to
many important deprivations in social process which states must observe in
the treatment of aliens irrespective of their treatment of their own na-
tionals. 62 The classic statement of this standard, in elaboration of Vatters
thesis, is that of Elihu Root:
Each country is bound to give to the nationals of another country
in its territory the benefit of the same laws, the same administration,
the same protection, and the same redress for injury which it gives to
its own citizens, and neither more nor less: provided the protection
which the country gives to its own citizens conforms to the established
standard of civilization.
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of
such general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of
the international law of the world. The condition upon which any
country is entitled to measure the justice due from it to an alien by
the justice which it accords to its own citizens is that its system of
law and administration shall conform to this general standard. If any
country's system of law and administration does not conform to that
of no avail. They have repudiated the theory of responsibility not only in their
diplomatic correspondence, but in their statutes, their treaties, and even in their
constitutions. From a purely political point of view, the position of the Latin
American states may be regarded as a protest against indiscriminate intervention
by European states. It is an effort, moreover, to maintain the privileges of equality
of states and the inviolability of territorial sovereignty. From the juridical stand-
point, however, we see in this attempt at repudiation of the theory of respon-
sibility, a final effort to regulate the liability of the state by municipal legislation.
This in turn may be in some measure understood as a heritage of the mother
country which, in the course of develojiment, has taken a new direction.
Goebel, supra note 30, at 832.
62Borchard aptly summarized:
Thus, while equality is the ultimate that the alien may ask of municipal law,
which is by no means bound to grant equality, the body of international law
developed by diplomatic practice and arbitral decision, vague and indefinite as it
may be, represents the minimum which each state must accord the alien whom
it admits. Whether called the fundamental, natural, or inherent rights of humanity
or of man or of the alien, this minimum has acquired a permanent place in the
protective ambit of international forums.
Borchard, The 'Minimum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens, 33 ASIL Pnocs. 51, 53
(1939).
On the international minimum standard, see C. AMEAsInGHm, supra note 39 at 278-
81; E. BORCHAaD, supra note 4, at 39-43, 104-09; H. Braces, supra note 39, at 562-67;
I. BRoNLiE, supra note 7, at 510-14; F. DuNN, supra note 19, at 113-72; C. EArLE-
TON, supra note 39, at 82-87; A. FmmAN, supra note 4, at 497-570; 1 L. OPPENEmf,
supra note 39, at 350-52; A. bOTm, supra note 31, at 81-123; BF_STATEmENT, supra
note 8, at 501-07; H. STEnam & D. VAcrrs, supra note 13, at 360-530; 8 M. WnrHr-
MAs_, DIGEST OF INTERNATONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 697-704; Freeman, Recent
Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International Law, 40 AJIL 121
(1946); Garcia-Amador, supra note 39, at 429-31; Garcia-Amador's First Report, supra
note 8, at 199-201; Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 AJIL 243, 260 (1941);
Verdross, Les RJgles Internationales concernant le Traitement des Etrangers, 37 HAGuE
PmCUmL DES CouRs 323, 348-88 (1931).
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standard, although the people of the country may be content or com-
pelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept
it as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens. 3
The same formulation, echoed by many commentators, was supported by a
majority of the state delegations represented at the Hague Codification
Conference of 1930.64 The Permanent Court of International Justice, in
the Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
(Merits), in outlining Poland's competence under a special agreement to
derogate "from the rules generally applied in regard to the treatment of
foreigners and the principle of respect for vested rights," 65 referred both
positively to "the limits set by the generally accepted principles of inter-
national law" and negatively to "generally accepted international law" as
establishing "the only measures prohibited." 06
The most important contribution toward the crystallization of this stand-
ard has come, however, in innumerable decisions rendered by international
arbitral tribunals. The decisions of the United States-Mexican Claims
Commission, established under the General Claims Convention of 1923,
6-Root, The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad, 4 ASIL Paocs. 20-21
(1910).
More recently, Wilfred Jenks wrote:
The test is the "ordinary standards of civilisation"; the common denominator is
the "practice of civilised nations"; the criterion is the judgment of a "reasonable and
impartial man." These are all conceptions so general that their content will neces-
sarily be determined by the policy of the ties. The diplomatic protection of
citizens abroad has often been associated in the past with the exercise of m ltary,
political or economic pressure by stronger against weaker States and it is therefore
not a matter for surprise that a growing resistance to the concept of an inter-
national standard should have bee n almost inevitable feature of a period ofsharp criticism of neo-colonialism; but an international standard, fairly applied, isboth so fundamental an element in the concept of internationally guaranteed basic
human ights and so essential a prerequisite of any mutually beneficial.inter-
national economic intercourse that the concept may be expected to reassert itself
in deference to overriding considerations of international public policy which are
entitled to claim, and may be expected to receive, general acceptance.
C. JENKS, Tsn PROsPEcTs OF LNTEIRNATIONAL An/uDIcATION 514-15 (1964) (foototes
omitted).
64 See Borchard, Responsibility of States at the Hague Codification Conference, 24AJIL 517 (1930). See also H. BfrGS, supra note 39, at 563-64; I. BROWN-, supra
note 7, at 510; A. ROTh, supra note 31, at 104-11.
65 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits),[192.6] P.C.I.J., ser A, No. 7, at 22.
f. the summary of Freeman:
The contention that equality with nationals is the measure of a state's international
obligations to aliens has been repeatedly rejected by international claims commis-
sions as well as by the Permanent Court of International Justice itself That court
in the case concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia expressly
recognized the existence of a common or generally accepted international law
respecting the treatment of aliens and which is applicable to them despite munic-
ipal legislation.Freeman, Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge to International
Law, 40 AJIL 121, 16 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
67 See A. FELLER, T al MEXICAN CLAIMS COansso NS, 1923-1934 (1935); A. RoTH,
supra note 31, at 94-99; Borchard, Decisions of the Claims Commissions, United States
and Mexico, 20 AJIL 536 (1926).
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have been especially influential.67 In one of its first decisions, the Neer
case,68 while disallowing U.S. claims that Mexican authorities did not
exercise due diligence in apprehending armed murderers, this Commission
affirmed that
the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of inter-
national standards, and... that the treatment of an alien, in order to
constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an outrage,
to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of govern-
mental action so far short of international standards that every reason-
able and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.
Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient execution of an
intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the country do not
empower the authorities to measure up to international standards is
immaterial.69
Later in the Roberts case,70 in holding that equality of treatment of na-
tionals was no defense to the U.S. charge that Mexican authorities bad
arbitrarily and illegally arrested an American citizen and subjected him to
cruel and inhumane treatment for a long period of time, the Commission
reaffirmed:
Facts with respect to equality of treatment of aliens and nationals may
be important in determining the merits of a complaint of mistreatment
of an alien. But such equality is not the ultimate test of the propriety
of the acts of authorities in the light of international law. That test is,
broadly speaking, whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordi-
nary standards of civilization. 71
The Commission's "consistent" jurisprudence "along the lines of a well-
founded and necessary postulate" 72 led Roth to observe:
The minimum standard has therewith become a reality which nobody
may defy with impunity any more, and judging from its success, it
certainly turned out that demand of long standing had been fulfilled
with it.78
The doctrine of a minimum international standard found concrete ex-
pression, further, in numerous treaties, especially those of friendship, com-
merce, and navigation.74 For example, the Convention respecting Con-
ditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction between the British
Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, &c., and Turkey, signed at Lausanne
6S The United States of America on behalf of L.F.H. Neer and Pauline E. Neer,
Claimants v. The United Mexican States (October 15, 1926), in C.AWvs Comnssios,
UNITED STATES AIM MExICO, OPINIONS OF CO.MMSSIONEnS UNDER TE CONVENTION
CONCLUDED SEPrEmBER 8, 1923 BETw THE UNrD STATES AND ME.ico, FEBIRUARY
4, 1926, To JULY 23, 1927, at 71 (1927) [hereinafter cited as OPINIONS OF ComNfls-
siomms]; 4 U.N.R.I.A.A. 60; [1925-1926] ANN. DiC. Case No. 154, at 214.
6eOpn 7oNs OF CoMMISsiONEnS, supra note 68, at 73.
7o The United States of America, on behalf of Harry Roberts, Claimant, v. The
United Mexican States (November 2, 1926), in OPINIONS or ConMssxoNns, supra
note 68, at 100; 4 U.N.R.I.A.A. 77; 21 AJIL 357 (1927).
7' OPMIONS Or CommissioNEs, supra note 68, at 105; 21 AJIL 357, 361 (1927).
72 A. RoTn, supra note 31, at 97. 73 Ibid.
74 See R. WnsoN, supra note 50.
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on July 24, 1923, stipulated:
In Turkey the nationals of the other Contracting powers will be re-
ceived and treated, both as regards their persons and property, in ac-
cordance with ordinary international law...75
The reference to "ordinary international law" has been well understood.
In Roth's words:
Common international law provides for a special regime for the alien,
largely consisting in a certain standard of treatment, which we have
called the minimum standard. It is apparent therefore that any refer-
ence to the principles of common international law with regard to the
treatment of the alien implies the recognition of the minimum stand-
ard.
7 3
Though many of the agreements in the vast network of the treaties of
friendship, commerce, and navigation that the United States has concluded
with other countries provide for varying standards of treatment, including
national treatment, with regard to different types of problems, they reflect
an overall commitment to a minimum international standard.77 Thus, the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany of 1954-the prototype of such
treaties in the post World War II era-provides in Article 1:
1. Each Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable treatment
to the nationals and companies of the other Party, and to their prop-
erty, enterprises and other interests.
2. Between the territories of the two Parties there shall be, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the present Treaty, freedom of com-
merce and navigation.7 8
The standards established in many of these treaties often go beyond na-
75 28 LNTS 151, 157.
Another example is the Treaty of Friendship and Establishment between Egypt and
Persia of 1928 which provided, in Article 4, that
The nationals of each of the High Contracting parties . .. shall enjoy, on the
same footing as nationals, the most constant protection and security for their
persons, property, rights and interests, in conformity with ordinary international
law.
93 LNTS 381, 397. 76 A. BOTH, supra note 31, at 99.
77B. WILSo,, supra note 50, at 6-9. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, T._AnTms IN
FoncE: A LisT oF TREATES AND OTHER INTERNATioNAL AGPENxErs OF THE UNrrED
STATEs im FoRcE ON JAuAnY 1, 1974 (Dep't of State Pub. 8755, 1974); B. WILsow,
TBE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD iN TRETmS OF THE UNrra STATES 87-134
(1953). For a test example see Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United
States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania; TRADE AGRENrr BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND RoMANLt, H.R. Doc. No. 94-114, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); 14 1LM 671 (1975).
Treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation between countries other than -the
United States are similar in terms. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between Japan and the Argentine Republic, signed on 20 December 1961;
613 UNTS 323.
78 [1954] 7 UST 1839, 1841; 273 UNTS 3,4; TIAS No. 3593.
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tional treatment in relation to particular problems, most notably in the
form of "most-favored-nation-treatment." 79
The minimum international standard for treatment of aliens, like all
prescriptions which require delicate relation to the many varying features
of differing contexts, has of necessity been left highly general in its empirical
reference. The distinction between the lawful differentiation of the status
within a country of nationals and aliens upon a reasonable basis and the
discrimination against the alien which is arbitrary and unlawful must de-
pend not only upon the values which are primarily at stake but also upon
many varying features of the institutional practices by which such values
are sought and shaped. The minimum international standard has, how-
ever, despite this fundamental difficulty shared by most other important
prescriptions, been frequently and widely applied for the protection of
aliens in many different value and institutional contexts. 0
A most comprehensive summary is offered by Roth, though some com-
mentators may not agree with all his characterizations:
(1) An alien, whether natural person or corporation, is entitled by
international law to have his juridical personality and legal capacity
recognized by the receiving State.
(2) The alien can lawfully demand respect for his life and protec-
tion for his body.
(3) International law protects the alien's personal and spiritual
liberty within socially bearable limits.
(4) According to general international law, aliens enjoy no political
rights in their State of residence, but have to fulfil such public duties as
are not incompatible with allegiance to their home State.
(5) General international law gives aliens no right to be econom-
ically active in foreign States. In cases where the national policies of
foreign States allow aliens to undertake economic activities, however,
general international law assures aliens of equality of commercial treat-
ment among themselves.
(6) According to general international law, the alien's privilege of
participation in the economic life of his State of residence does not go
79 On most-favored-nation treatment, see generally L. CHEN, STATE SUCCESSiON
RELATING TO UNEQuAL ThEATrES 96-108 (1974); Schwarzenberger, The Most-Favoured
Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22 Bmr. Y.B. IhT'L L. 99 (1945); The
Most-Favored-Nation Clause in the Law of Treaties, working paper submitted by
Mr. Endre Ustor, UN Doe. A/CN.4/L.127 (1968), [1968] 2 Y.B. Ihq'L L. CoMm'x
165; Ustor, [First] Report on the Most-Favored Nation Clause, UN Doc. A/CN.4/213
(1969); Second Report, UN Doc. A/CN.4/228 & Add. 1 (1970); Third Report, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/257 & Add. 1 (1972); Fourth Report, UN Doe. A/CN.4/266 (1973).
8o See A. ROTH, supra note 31, at 127-91; H. STEImm & D. VaTS, supra note 13,
at 357-530. See also note 62 supra. One important contemporary mode of settling
disputes about the treatment of aliens is that of lump sum settlement between states.
The inherited doctrines about aliens appear to achieve a continuing viability both in
the terms of settlement and in the internal decisions by which the agreed sums are
apportioned. Note the wide range in types of controversies indicated in the compre-
hensive and insightful study, R. LnLicn & B. Wso N, LNTEmmATiONAL CLAnts: Tumr
SETTLEmEN BY Lump Sum AacnmuENrs (1975).
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so far as to allow him to acquire private property. The State of resi-
dence is free to bar him from ownership of all certain property,
whether movables or realty.
(7) Wherever the alien enjoys the privilege of ownership of property,
international law protects his rights in so far as his property may not
be expropriated under any pretext, except for moral or penal reasons,
without adequate compensation. Property rights are to be understood
as rights to tangible property which have come into concrete existence
according to the municipal law of the alien's State of residence.
(8) International law grants the alien procedural rights in his State
of residence as primary protection against the violation of his substan-
tive rights. These procedural rights amount to freedom of access to
court, the right to a fair, non-discriminatory and unbiased hearing, the
right to full participation in any form in the procedure, the right to ajust decision rendered in full compliance with the laws of the State
within a reasonable time.8'
Long before it sought generally to protect the fundamental rights of the
individual against his own state, international law created, thus, an ex-
tensive and important protection for aliens in many different value
processes. 82
8l A. RoTE, supra note 31, at 185-86. For a more detailed analysis of this recapitula-
tion, see id. at 127-85.
8 2 The special protection accorded aliens under customary international law was
such that Lauterpacht offered this observation:
Although international law does not at present recognise, apart from treaty, any
fundamental rights of the individual protected by international society as against
the State of which he is a national, it does acknowledge some of the principal
fundamental rights of the individual in one particular sphere, namely, in respect
of aliens. These are entitled to treatment conforming to a minimum standard
of civilisation regardless of how the State where they reside treats its own nationals.
That minimum standard of civilisation comprises, in particular, the right of personal
liberty and, generally, the right to equality before the law. International tribunals
have repeatedly declared it to be a rule of international law. The result, which
is somewhat paradoxical, is that the individual in his capacity as an alien enjoys
a larger measure of protection by international law than in his character as the
citizen of his own State.
H. LAuTERPAcn-r, IrErtNATONAL LAW AN HumAN RGHTs 121 (1950; 1968).
A specification of the exact scope of the protection thus accorded to aliens by
customary international law would require a comprehensive study of past decisions,
value by value. WThether a particular differentiation of aliens and nationals has a
reasonable basis in the common interest of the larger community must of course depend
not only upon the value primarily at stake in the differentiation but also upon many
particular, and varying, features of the context in which the differentiation is made.
It is this infinite complexity in the patterning of fact, as well as the failure to clarify
common interest, which accounts for some of the continuing controversy over particular
kinds of deprivations of aliens, such as in the nationalization or expropriation of
property and the unilateral termination of agreements. See note 13 supra. This
controversy has recently been dramatized in the adoption by the UN General Assembly
of "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" and
its accompanying "Programme of Action" in May 1974 and of "The Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States" in December 1974. See G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI),
May 1, 1974, UN GAOR, 6 SPEc. SEss., Supp.1, at 3, UN Doe. A/9559 (1974); G.A.
Res. 3202 (S-VI), May 1, 1974, id. at 6: G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Dec. 12, 1974,
UN Doe. A/Res/3281 (XXIX) (1975). See also 13 ILM 715 (1974); id., 720; 14 id.
251 (1975); 68 AJIL 798 (1974); 69 id. 484 (1975). For further pertinent references
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The new epoch in the international protection of human rights ushered
in by the United Nations has, paradoxically, been attended by some un-
necessary confusion about the continued protection of aliens. The rapid
multiplication of newly independent states, arising from the emancipation
of ex-colonial peoples, and the deepening of ideological rifts about the
world have brought intense challenges to many customary prescriptions,
including those about the responsibility of states.8 8 The principle of the
minimum international standard for the protection of aliens has been sub-
jected to especially severe attack. Thus, Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico)
(later Judge of the International Court of Justice), in reinforcement of
traditional Latin American attitudes, spoke sharply before the International
Law Commission:
The vast majority of new States had taken no part in the creation of
the many institutions of international law which were consolidated and
systematized in the nineteenth century. In the case of the law of the
sea, for instance, though the future needs and interests of newly-
established small countries were not taken into account, at least the
body of principles thus created was not directly inimical to them.
With State responsibility, however, international rules were established,
not merely without reference to small States but against them, and
were based almost entirely on the unequal relations between great
Powers and small States. Probably ninety-five per cent of the inter-
national disputes involving State responsibility over the last century
had been between a great industrial Power and a small, newly-estab-
lished State. Such inequality of strength was reflected in an inequality
of rights, the vital principle of international law, par in parem non
habet imperium being completely disregarded .... 114
to this development, see Recent Developments, The General Assemblys International
Economics, 16 HASv. INT'L L. J. 670 (1975). A panorama of conflicting views is offered
in 3 THE VALUATION oF NATIONALaZED PnOPEmY i INTmNATIONAL LAW (R. Lillich
ed. 1975).8s Cf. generally ASIAN STATES AND TE DEVELOPmNT OF UNIVERSAL INTRN ATIONAL
LAW (B. Anand ed. 1972); A. BozmsmA, THE FuTun oF LAw IN A MULTICULTURAL
Wonmw (1971); L. CEHN, supra note 79; J. CoEN & H. Cm-u, PxoPLE'S CHINA AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY ST=Y (1974); W. Fmmnwzs, ThE CaNNG
SmRuaruBE OF INTmRATIONAL LAW (1964); B. IGGINs, CON Ur OF INTEREST
(1964); F. OKOYE, ITrNATIONAL LAW AND THE Nmv AmcAN STATES (1972);
B. ROLIG, INTERNATIONAL LAw 3x AN ExpAm Woni, (1960); S. SiNHA, NEw
NATIONS AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1967); J. SYATAUW, SOME NEwLY EsTAIILIsiED
STATES AND TE DVEL OPMENT OF INT'ENATIONAL LAw (1961); G. TUNMN, supra
note 39; Castafieda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of International
Law, 15 INr'L ORG. 38 (1961); Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies:
Prospects and Proposals, 84 YAiE L. J. 969 (1975); Falk, The New States and Inter-
national Legal Order, 118 HAGmE BECUEm DES Couns 1 (1966); Fatouros, Internatfonal
Law and the Third World, 50 VA. L. REv. 783 (1964); Fatouros, The Participation of
the "New" States in the International Legal Order, in 1 THE FUrUrE oF =INTER-
NATIONAL LEAL ORDmn 317-71 (B. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969); Guha-Roy, Is the
Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens A Part of Universal International
Law?, 55 AJIL 863 (1961), reprinted in L. GROSS, supra note 39, at 537-65; Lissitzyn,
International Law in a Divided World, 542 INT'L CoNCLIATIoN (1963); McDougal &
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53
AJIL 1 (1959), reprinted in L. GRoss, supra note 39, at 169-97.
84 [1957] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Coxa'N 155 (Remarks at the 413th meeting).
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A more detailed attack was made by S. N. Guha-Roy, who proposed a
"thorough reexamination" of the customary law about the responsibility of
states for injuries to aliens, "from the standpoint of the new states" and in
the interest of an "absolute justice." 85 Building upon the assumption that
"a custom [is] in no way binding on other states, unless it can be shown to
have had its roots in some general principles of law of a more or less uni-
versal character," 86 Guha-Roy has no difficulty in concluding that "the
law of responsibility of states for aliens" is not a "part of universal inter-
national law:" 87
The law of responsibility then, is not founded on any universal prin-
ciples of law or morality. Its sole foundation is custom, which is bind-
ing only among states where it either grew up or came to be adopted.
It is thus hardly possible to maintain that it is still part of universal
international law. Whatever the basis of obligation in international
law in the past, when the international community was restricted to
only a few states, including those, fewer still, admitted into it from
time to time, the birth of a new world community has brought about
a radical change which makes the traditional basis of obligation out-
moded.8
It should be obvious that from Guha-Roy's mystical assumption about how
transnational expectations of authority are created the same, or the op-
posite, conclusion could be made about any asserted prescription. 9
The more substantive arguments Guha-Roy makes for dismissing "what
is ordinarily presented as the international standard of justice" are stated
in the form of "five objections:"
First, a national of one state, going out to another in search of wealth
or for any other purpose entirely at his own risk, may well be left to
the consequences of his own ventures, even in countries known to be
dangerous. For international law to concern itself with his protection
in a state without that state's consent amounts to an infringement of
that state's sovereignty. Secondly, a standard open only to aliens but
denied to a states own citizens inevitably widens the gulf between
citizens and aliens and thus hampers, rather than helps, free intercourse
among peoples of different states. Thirdly, the standard is rathervague and indefinite. Fourthly, the very introduction of an external
yardstick for the internal machinery of justice is apt to be looked upon
as an affront to the national system, whether or not it is below the
international standard. Fft hly', a different standard of justice forali ns results in a twofold differentiation in a t te where the internal
standard is below the international standard. Its citizens as aliens in
other states are entitled to a higher standard than their fellow citizens
at home. Again, the citizens of other states as aliens in it are also
entitled to abetter standard than its own citizens. '
These "objections" may be observed to ignore the role of the international
8z Guha-Roy, supra note 83, at 537-65. 8 Id. at 546.
87 Id. at 562. 88 Ibid.
89 Guha-Roy repeatedly makes clear that he regards "custom" and "general principles"
as distinct and that his "general principles" are to be found only in some brooding
metaphysical or "natural law" omnipresence. See id. at 539, 546, 550, 555.
9 OId. at 563.
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standard in the maintenance of a world economy and society, to under-
estimate the interests of any particular territorial community in the main-
tenance of such larger economy and society, to minimize the importance of
the international protection of the human rights of even citizens or na-
tionalsy1 to undercut the vast flow across state lines today of prescriptive
communication about the protection of both nationals and aliens, and to
aggrandize the technical concepts of sovereignty and of territorial jurisdic-
tion.
In the context of such confusion it is understandable that the Inter-
national Law Commission has made little headway in its protracted effort
to clarify and codify the law of state responsibility.92 The first Special
Rapporteur of the Commission, Dr. Garcia-Amador, essayed a noble "syn-
thesis" of the newer emerging law of human rights and the older law
-designed for the protection of aliens in proposing both that the newer
human rights prescriptions be employed to give more precise content to
the inherited minimum international standard for aliens and that the newer
remedies being established for the protection of human rights generally be
made to suspersede certain aspects of the hallowed state interposition on
behalf of its injured nationals! 3 In eloquent diagnosis of the problem he
stated:
In traditional international law the "responsibility of States for damage
done in their territory to the person or property of foreigners" fre-
quently appears closely bound up with two great doctrines or prin-
ciples: the so-called "international standards of justice," and the prin-
91 Even in this day of the human rights movement, Guha-Roy writes: "It is, how-
,ever, no concern of international law how a state discharges its responsibility to its
own nationals or if it discharges that responsibility at all." Id. at 538.92 See Baxter, Reflections on Codification in Light of the International Law of State
Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, 16 SynACuSE L. Rxv. 745 (1965); Lrumcn,
Toward the Formulation of an Acceptable Body of Law Concerning State Responsi-
bility id., 721.
For an overall review, see Garcia-Amador's Six Reports, supra note 8. For more
recent developments, see First report on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago,
Special Rapporteur, [1969] 2 Y.B. IT'L L. Comm'N 125-56, UN Doc. A/CN.4/217 and
Add.1 (1969) (it deals with "Review of previous work on codification of the topic of
the international responsibility of States"); Supplement, prepared by the Secretariat,
to the "Digest of the decisions of international tribunals relating to state responsibility,"
t19691 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Cox.ne'N 101-13, UN Doc. A/CN.4/208 (1969); Proposals sub-
mitted to, and decisions of, various United Nations organs relating to the question of
State responsibility: supplement prepared by the Secretariat to document A/CN.4/165,
[1969] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CowXN' 114-24, UN Doc. A/CN.4/209 (1969); Second report
on State responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur, [1970] 2 Y.B. ITr'L L.
CommN 177-97, UN Doe. A/CN.4/233 (1970) ("The origin of international respon-
sibility"). For a recent discussion on the question of state responsibility before the
International Law Commission, see [1973] 1 Y.B. Ie'L L. Comv'N 5-66 (1202nd
meeting to 1215th meeting). See also Kearney, The Twenty-Six Session of the Inter-
national Law Commission, 69 AJIL 591, 602-07 (1975).
The more recent work of the Commission has been at such a high level of abstrac-
tion as to shed but a dim light upon specific controversies. The underlying assump-
tion seems to be that state responsibility is best studied apart from particular context.
93 See Garcia-Amadofs First Report, supra note 8, at 199-203; Garcia-Amador,
supra note 39, at 467.
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ciple of the equality of nationals and aliens. The first of these
principles has been invoked in the past as the basis for the exercise
of the right of States to protect their nationals abroad, while the
second has been relied on for the purpose of rebutting responsibility
on the part of the State of residence when the aliens concprned re-
ceived the same treatment and were granted the same legal or judicial
protection as its own nationals.
Although, therefore, both principles had the same basic purpose,
namely, the protection of the person and of his property, they appeared
both in traditional theory and in past practice as mutually conflicting
and irreconcilable.
Yet, if the question is examined in the light of international law in its
present stage of development, one obtains a very different impression.
What was formerly the object of these two principles- the protection
of the person and of his property-is now intended to be accomplished
by the international recognition of the essential rights of man. Under
this new legal doctrine, the distinction between nationals and aliens
no longer has any raison d6tre, so that both in theory and in practice
these two traditional principles are henceforth inapplicable. In effect,
both of these principles appear to have been outgrown by contem-
porary international law. 4
His basic proposal was for equality of nationals and aliens, with both a
minimum and a maximum in internationally recognized "fundamental
human rights:"
1. The State is under a duty to ensure to aliens the enjoyment of
the same civil rights, and to make available to them the same in-
dividual guarantees as are enjoyed by its own nationals. These rights
and guarantees shall not, however, in any case be less than the "funda-
mental human rights" recognized and defined in contemporary inter-
national instruments.
2. In consequence, in case of violation of civil rights, or disregard
of individual guarantees, with respect to aliens, international responsi-
bility will be involved only if internationally recognized "fundamental
human rights" are affected. 5
The "fundamental human rights" he specified for framing the combined
contours of state responsibility were extensive:
(a) The right to life, liberty and security of person;
(b) The right of the person to the inviolability of his privacy, home
and correspondence, and to respect for his honour and reputation;
(c) The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
(d) The right to own property;
(e) The right of the person to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law;
(f) The right to apply to the courts of justice or to the competent
organs of the State, by means of remedies and proceedings which offer
adequate and effective redress for violations of the aforesaid rights and
freedoms;
94 Id. at 199.
95 Garcia-AmadoFs Second Report, supra note 8, at 112-13.
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(g) The right to a public hearing, with proper safeguards, by the
competent organs of the State, in the determination of rights and ob-
ligations under civil law;
(h) In criminal matters, the right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty; the right to be informed of the charge
made against him in a language which he understands; the right to
speak in his defense or to be defended by a counsel of his choice; the
right not to be convicted of any punishable offence on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute an offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed; the right to be
tried without delay or to be released. 0
This imaginative proposal by Dr. Garcia-Amador has not, unhappily,
enjoyed wide approval from either state spokesmen or private commen-
tators. By some his proposal is thought to extend the substantive protec-
tion of aliens much beyond what states can reasonably be expected to
accept and to exacerbate the problems of cooperation between states of
differing degrees of socializationfr By others he might be thought, per-
haps justifiably, to weaken an important traditional remedy for the protec-
tion of aliens before any effective new remedy is established in replace-
ment 98
The newly emerged contemporary human rights prescriptions, including
both the United Nations Charter and ancillary expressions, would indeed
appear, however these prescriptions may ultimately be synthesized with
the older doctrines of state responsibility, to have importantly increased
the transnational protection that world constitutive process affords aliens.D
96 Id. at 113.
97 C. Amm a RICHE, supra note 39, at 278-81, I. BROWN=I, supra note 7, at 513-14.
os In the words of Amerasinghe:
There is scope, then, for the application in practice of the general non-conventional
law of alien treatment, in view of the absence of any universal conventional law
to replace it, whether in regard to economic interests alone or in regard to per-
sonal and social interests as well. What is more, any general convention governing
the responsibility of States for injuries to aliens must take into account the
existing general non-conventional law.
C. AmL:RAsNGnE, supra note 39, at 7.
See Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle
of International Law under Attack, 69 AJIL 359 (1975).
99 in the words of Sir Humphrey Waldock:
International lawyers have already begun to speak of the assimilation of the
customary law regarding the treatment of aliens with the new law of the Charter
regarding "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights." The assimila-
tion is logical enough so far as concerns the "minimum standards" of treatment
that is, the scope of the fundamental rights and freedoms protected by international
law. Human Rights, ex hypothesi, are rights which attach to all human beings
equally, whatever their nationality. And in general, as I have said, the Universal
Declaration offers aliens at least as much as the minimum standards of treatment
guaranteed under customary law. To assimilate the position of aliens to that of
nationals in regard to remedies would, however, be wholly unacceptable in the
present state of international remedies for violations of human rights.
Waldock, Human Rights in Contemporary International Law and the Significance of
the European Convention, in T=E EUROPEAN CoNvEN oN ON HUMAN rIGHTs 1, 3
(1965) (The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, International
Law Series No. 5) (footnote omitted).
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Although nowhere in the Charter or other nondiscrimination prescriptions
is alienage specifically included among the impermissible grounds of differ-
entiation,101 it is unmistakably clear that in the future differentiation of
The protection of the rights of aliens is a matter of current concern within the
United Nations. Pursuant to Resolution 1790 (LIV) of May 18, 1973 of the Economic
and Social Council, as originated from a resolution of the Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in August 1972 that was endorsed
by the Commission on Human Rights, the UN Secretary-General conducted in 1973
a "survey of international instruments in the field of human rights concerning dis-
tinctions in the enjoyment of certain rights as between nationals and individuals who
are not citizens of the States in which they live." See The Problem of the Applicability
of Existing International Provisions for the Protection of the Human Rights of In-
dividuals Who Are Not Citizens of the Country in which They Live, UN Doe. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/335 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note on Aliens by the Secretary-General].
Cf. also Briggs, The "Rights of Aliens" and International Protection of Human Rights,
in Asprcrs OF LmETYr 213-31 (M. Konvitz & C. Rossiter eds. 1958); Freeman,
Human Rights and the Rights of Aliens, 45 ASIL PNocs. 120 (1951).
The distinction made by Weis between protection of the interests of states under the
customary international law of state responsibility and the interests of the larger inter-
national community under the human rights prescriptions is an utterly artificial one,
which should be made to disappear. See Weis, Diplomatic Protection of Nationals and
Intcrnational Protection of Human Rights, 4 HtwuN RiGHTs J. 643, 675 (1971).
31 00See UN Charter, Arts. 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c), 56, 62(2), and 76(c); The
Protection of Respect and Human Rights, supra note 2, at 1034-41.
It has been suggested by a reader that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights do not protect aliens because "nationality"
is not listed as a prohibited ground of differentiation. This astonishing interpretation
of these various prescriptions finds no basis even in the literal words of these
prescriptions.
The Universal Declaration, in the first paragraph of Article 2, provides:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any lnd, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, polit-
ical or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
UN'TrD NATIoNs, HuNA.- RIGHrS: A ComruFI.,ATxoN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRumENTS OF
TiE UN[ED NATIONs 1, UN Doc. ST/HR/I (1973) [hereinafter cited as UN HUrAN
RiGrrrs LsTRU ,\MNrs]. It will be noted that these words stipulate that "all the rights
and freedoms" are conferred upon "everyone," and begin the list of prohibited grounds
with "such as," clearly indicating that the list is not intended to be exhaustive. A
similar formulation appears in Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to
all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recog-
nized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
UN HumAN,- RiGHTs INsTRtTumNrs, supra, at 8 (emphasis added). It has been generally
recognized that one of the major purposes of the whole panoply of human rights pre-
scriptions has been to accord the nationals of a state the same protection previously
accorded aliens and to make unnecessary, in general, any differentiation between aliens
and nationals. There is nothing in the legislative history (travaux pr6paratoires) of
these prescriptions to suggest any intent to exclude aliens from protection.
The one possible exception to this conclusion is in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which is worded somewhat differently from the
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treatment because of alienage will be much more strictly confined and that
unlawful discrimination, with respect to many values, may be much more
readily found.
It may be recalled that though the United Nations Charter enumerates
only four specific grounds of impermissible differentiation-race, sex, lan-
guage, and religion-these are intended to be illustrative and not exhaus-
tive. The more detailed formulation in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights makes this abundantly clear.010 The standard formula em-
ployed by the Universal Declaration is: "Everyone has the right to ... " 102
Negatively, the formula is: "No one shall be. . . ." 103 "Everyone" would
appear to refer to all human beings, national and alien alike. When
"everyone" is given a restrictive reference to a national only, the Universal
Declaration makes this explicitly clear. Thus, Article 21 provides in part:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 2(2) reads:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
UN HumAN RBcnms INsrtumrxrs, supra, at 4 (emphasis added). Note the substitu-
tion of "discrimination" for "distinction" and the substitution of "as to" for "such as."
Article 2(3) adds:
Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national eco-
nomy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights
recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.
UN Hum liGjrrs INsTRumEzrs, supra, at 4. These provisions could, unfortunately
for common interest, be construed to permit some states to discriminate against aliens
with respect to some economic rights. It has been recorded that Article 2(3) was
adopted by the Third Committee of the General Assembly by "41 votes to 38, with
12 abstentions," and that it was characterized by many delegates as "contrary to the
spirit of universality and equality underlying the draft Covenant and likely to give rise
to all kinds of discrimination alien to the intentions of the sponsors." Sohn, Supple-
mentary Paper: A Short History of United Nations Documents on Human Rights, in
CoMMIssION TO STUDY TE= ORGANIzATioN OF PEAcE, ThE Uma=n NATIONS AND HU-
mAN BiGHTs 38, 116 (1968). The ambiguities in the language of Article 2(2)(3)
are spelled out in Note on Aliens by the Secretary-General, supra note 99, at 8-11.
It may be noted, incidentally, that the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights has been operative since January 3, 1976. 12 UN MoNrn.Y CnmoN-
xcLE 28 (Nov. 1975). Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights has been operative since March 23, 1976. 13 id. 73 (Jan. 1976).
1o3 See Note on Aliens by the Secretary-General, supra note 99, at 7.
102 E.g., Article 3: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person."
Article 10: "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations
and of any criminal charge against him." UN HuMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 100, at 1. See also Arts. 2, 6, 8, 11(1), 13, 14, 15(1), 17(1), 18, 19, 20(1), 21,
22, 23, 24, 26(1), 27, 28, 29(1), in id. at 1-3.
1O3E.g., Article 5: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or pinishment." Article 17(2): "No one shall be arbitrarily de-




2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.' 04
This is the only place in the Universal Declaration that a specified right
is reserved for nationals only.105 This provision reflects only the long
shared community expectation that differentiation on the basis of alienage
is permissible in regard to participation in the making of community de-
cisions, i.e., voting and office-holding.10 6 The concern in the Universal
Declaration that human rights be protected for every human being, regard-
less of nationality, is further manifested in the latter half of Article 2:
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which
a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing
or under any other limitation of sovereignty.107
This same concern for all human beings is even more pronounced in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This Covenant again
employs, in general, the formulae that "Everyone shall have the right to
.. ." 10 and that "No one shall be.. ." "I" Reference is clearly to every per-
son, national or alien. Where distinction is intended between nationals and
aliens, the Covenant is explicit. Thus, Article 25 provides:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable.
restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or througl
freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which,
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors;
() To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service
in his country.10
The wording "every citizen" instead of "everyone" is significant. Again,
104 Ibid.
205 Articles 13(2) of the Universal Declaration provides that "Everyone has the right
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." The right to
return, thus, purports to extend only to nationals. Conversely, the asylum provision,
Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration, that "Everyone has the right to seek and
to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution" is obviously intended for non-
nationals.
I08 See H. SANTA CRUz, STUDY or DiscnhnNATiON IN THE MATTm OF PoLrIxcAL
RIGHTs 26-27, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/213/Rev.1 (1962).
107 UN H mtmq RIGHrs INS-muMENTS, supra note 100, at 1.
.08 E.g., Article 19(1): "Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without inter-
ference." Id. at 11. See also Articles 9(1), 14(2)(3)(5), 16, 17(2), 18(1), 19(2),
22(1), id. at 9-11. In addition, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights employs
such subjects as " Every human being" (Art. 6(1)), "Anyone" (Arts. 9(2-5)), and
"All persons" (Arts. 10(1), 14(1), and 26). Id. at 9-11.
OD E.g., Article 11: "No one shall be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability
to fulfil a contractual obligation." Id. at 9. See also Arts. 7, 8, 14(7), 15(1), 17(1),
18(2). Id. at 9-11. "oId. at 11.
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this prescription is in deference to and expressive of the customary law
that permits exclusion of aliens from participation in voting and office-
holding. Similarly, Article 12(4) provides: "No one shall be arbitrarily
,deprived of the right to enter his own country." -1 When a prescription
concerns aliens only, it is thus made clear. Article 13 reads:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a Tecision
reached in accordance with law and shall, except where compelling
reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit
the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by,
and be represented for the purpose before, the competent authority or
a person or persons especially designated by the competent au-
thority.112
In the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
the rights protected are again designed for all human beings, irrespective
of nationality.3"1 Thus, the Covenant stipulates that the states parties
"recognize the right of everyone to" "Work," 114 "the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work," 115 "form trade unions and join the trade
union of his choice," 118 "social security," 111 "an adequate standard of
living," 118 "be free from hunger," 119 "the enjoyment of the highest attain-
able standard of physical and mental health," 120 "education," 121 "talce part
in cultural life" 122 and so on.
Even human rights conventions with a more restrictive focus are, again,
formulated generally in terms of every individual human being. When
III Id. at 10.
112 Id. The overriding goal for the protection of every human being, as enunciated
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is unequivocably reiterated
in the Optional Protocol to this Covenant. Thus, Article 1 of the Optional Protocol
reads:
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the present Protocol rec-
ognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications
from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication
shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant
which is not a party to the present Protocol.
Id. at 16. The protection and remedies are clearly extended to all "individuals sub-
ject to jurisdiction" of a contracting state, and not only those who possess its nationality.
113 It is clear that in this particular Covenant a state may differentiate treatment of
aliens from nationals upon a reasonable basis. This is very far from providing that a
state may discriminate against aliens. The reference, in Article 2(3), that "Developing
countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine
to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present
Covenant to non-nationals" would be totally unnecessary if states may generally dis-
criminate against aliens. For expressions of more tentative conclusions, see Note on
Aliens by the Secretary-General, supra note 99, at 8-11; Elles, supra note 1, at 308-09.
11& Art. 6(1), UN Hummr Pacrs InsTRumEus, supra note 100, at 4.
15 Art. 7. Ibid. 116 Art. 8(1) (a). Ibid.
117 Art. 9. Ibid. 118Art. 11(1). Id. at 5.
119 Art. 11(2). Ibid. 120 Art. 12. Ibid.
121Art. 13(1). Ibid. 122 Art. 15(1). Id. at 6.
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alienage becomes relevant, it appears clear from each particular context. 2 1
Special attention may be called to Article 1(2) of the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which reads:
This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions
or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between
citizens and non-citizens. 224
In the light of the major purposes of the Convention and the relevant con-
text, it would appear clear that this provision was intended only to reserve
to states a competence to continue to make the historic differentiations be-
tween aliens and nationals established as reasonable under customary inter-
national law. It was not intended as an oblique, new prescription that
alienage is in general a permissible ground of discrimination. 25 Differen-
tiation on the basis of alienage in regard to such matters as voting and
office-holding, as customarily accepted, continues to be permissible, but the
standard of treatment accorded to aliens, as established under customary
international law and the contemporary human rights law with respect to
other values, is not to be diluted.'2
The two regional human rights conventions-European and American-
are both cast in broad language designed to protect aliens as well as na-
tionals. The European Convention, in Article 1, provides:
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Con-
vention."27
'2. 3 See, e.g., Article 3(e) of the Convention against Discrimination in Education: "In
order to eliminate and prevent discrimination within the meaning of this Convention,
the States Parties thereto undertake: ... (e) To give foreign nationals resident within
their territory the same access to education as that given to their own nationals." Id.
at 31-32. Cf. also Art. 3(c) of the same Convention, id. at 31; Declaration on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Art. 5, id. at 39; Convention relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons, Art. 3, id. at 61; Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees, Art. 3, id. at 68.
i-4 Id. at 24. The appropriate interpretation of this language in the light of the
major purposes of the Convention and the absence of travaux to the contrary is that
states may continue to differentiate betveen aliens and nationals on the bases that
historically have been regarded as having a reasonable relation to their differences.
This means, as was the principal thrust of the Convention for all individuals, that states
may not discriminate against aliens on racial grounds.
It may further be noted that Article 1(3) of this Convention provides:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal
provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization,
provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
125 Cf. Schwelb, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 15 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 996, 1006-09 (1966); Note on Aliens
by the Secretary-General, supra note 99, at 16-17.
12 See Schwelb, supra note 125, at 1007-08. Cf. also Note on Aliens by the Sec-
retary-General, supra note 99, at 16.
For an exposition of other prescriptions relevant to aliens, see Note on Aliens by the
Secretary-General, supra at 18-35. See also Elles, supra note 1; Weis, supra note 99.
1''7 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RtCi~rS: COLTECTED
TEXTS 2 (9th ed. 1974). Its text can also be conveniently found in BAsic DocUMENTs
ON ,INTEMIATIONAL PROTECTION OF HsnA-i BhonTs 125 (L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds.
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Thus, the European Commission on Human Bights has over the years re-
ceived innumerable individual petitions ("applications") brought by non-
nationals resident in the member states of the Council of Europe. 28 The
significance of this jurisprudence and practice has been underlined by
Fawcett:
This marks the great departure taken by the Convention from tradi-
tional forms of the international protection of individuals, for it dis-
penses with nationality as a condition of protection. Each contracting
State undertakes to secure the rights and freedoms of Section I to
everyone within its jurisdiction, whether he or she is an alien, a na-
tional of the State, or a stateless person, and regardless of civil status. 120
In keeping with the human rights conventions on the global scale, the
European Convention, in referring to a specified right, employs the gen-
eral formulae that "Everyone has the right to . 0" 1 and that "No one
shall be.. :" 18
The same interpretation would appear equally applicable to the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights. Significantly, the American Conven-
1973) [hereinafter cited as BAsic Docum=sl; and in BAsIc DocumENTs oN HUMfAN
RIGHTS 338, 340 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971).
128 For recent statistical data, see McNulty, Stock-Taking on the European Con-
vention on Human Rights 59-61, Doc. DH(73)8 (1973); McNulty, Stock-Taking on
the European Convention on Human Rights 66-69, Doc. DH(74) 6 (Oct. 1, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as McNulty's Stock-Taking 1974].
129J . FAwcETT, THE ArLICATiON OF TmS ExnopE'. Comrmqnv o HUMAN
RIGHTS 18 (1969).
120 See, e.g., Arts. 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13; BASIc DocumNTs, supra note 127, at
126-30.
231 See, e.g., Arts. 3, 4, 7; id. at 126, 128.
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Bights reads:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.
Id. at 130. It will be noted, again, that the list of prohibited grounds begins with
"such as," which clearly indicates that the list is merely illustrative. Cf. note 100 supra.
When the Convention intends to permit restrictions upon aliens, it explicitly says so.
Thus, Article 16 stipulates:
Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High Con-
tracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens.
Id. at 130. Similarly, Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, in Articles 3 and 4, makes
explicit the distinction between nationals and aliens. Article 3 reads:
1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collec-
tive measure, from the territory of the State of which he is a national.
2. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of
which he is a national.
Id. at 146. Article 4 states: "Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited." ibid.
The fact that an individual is an alien may of course be a relevant variable in con-
texts in which states engage in permissible accommodations and derogations, as pro-
vided in Articles 8-11 and 15 of the European Convention. Id. at 128-30. This does
not mean that alienage per se is a permissible ground for discrimination; it means only
that alienage continues to be in some contexts a fact that may rationally be taken into
account in determining the necessity and proportionality of a differentiation.
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tion contains, in the Preamble, the unique proclamation that
the essential rights of man are not derived from one's being a national
of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human per-
sonality. 32
The Convention thus specifies in Article 1:
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights
and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.
2. For the purposes of this Convention, "person" means every human
being.133
In regard to each of the specific rights to be protected, the Convention has
employed the standard formulae that "Every person (or "everyone") has
the right to .. ." 134 and that "No one shall be . . ." 1" When reference is
confined to aliens, it is explicitly stated. Thus, Article 22(6) reads: "An
alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to this Convention may be
expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with
law." 136 Article 22(8) stipulates:
In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regard-
less of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his
right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated be-
cause of his race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opin-
ions.2 7
Article 22(9) also reads: "The collective expulsion of aliens is pro-
hibited." "8 In contrast, when reference is restricted to nationals, it is also
clearly stated. Thus, Article 22(5) reads: "No one can be expelled from
the territory of the state of which he is a national or be deprived of the
right to enter it." '39 Similarly, Article 23 provides:
1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities:
a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives;
b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guar-
antees the free expression of the will of the voters; and
c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the
public service of his country.
a1zId. at 209.
133 Id. at 210.
The Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended, states in Article
3(j) that the "American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual
without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex." A. PEAsLEE, INTEBNAToNAL
GoV-azrEM,-rAL OnRGAzATONS 1182, 1183 (rev. 3d ed. 1974).
"3'See, e.g., Arts. 3, 4(1), 5(1), 7(1), 8, 10, 11, 12(1), 13(1), 16(1), 18, 20,
21(1), 22(l)(2), 25(1); BAsrc Docu NTs, supra note 127, at 210-18.
135 See, e.g., Arts. 5(2), 6, 7(2)(3), 9, 11(2), 12(2), 21(2); id. at 211-17.
236 Id. at 217. 137 Id. at 217-18.
-ss Id. at 218. '39 Id. at 217.
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2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities
referred to in the preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, na-
tionality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or
sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.140
In sum, the principal thrust of the contemporary human rights move-
ment is to accord nationals the same protection formerly accorded only to
aliens, while at the same time raising the standard of protection for all
human beings, nationals as well as aliens, far beyond the minimum inter-
national standard developed under the earlier customary law.141 When the
new human rights prescriptions are considered in mass, they extend to all
the basic human dignity values the peoples of the world today demand,
and the more detailed standards specified with regard to each of these
values exhibit all the precision and definiteness that rational application
either permits or requires. The consequence is thus, as Dr. Garcia-Amador
insisted, that continuing debate about the doctrines of the minimum inter-
national standard and equality of treatment has now become highly arti-
ficial; 142 an international standard is now authoritatively prescribed for
all human beings. It does not follow, however, that these new develop-
ments in substantive prescription about human rights have rendered ob-
solete the protection of individuals through the traditional procedures de-
veloped by the customary law of the responsibility of states for injuries to
aliens.
The notion, popularized by Vattel, that an injury to an alien individual
is an injury also to the state of his nationality served as justification for the
protection of the interests both of the state and of an important category of
individuals in an epoch when the nation-state was often regarded as "the
exclusive and sole subject" of international law. Even in a time, however,
when more catholic conceptions of the subjects of international law prevail
and individuals are being given more direct access to authoritative arenas
for their self-protection, the historic remedy of state claim for the protec-
tion of the individual would not appear to have ceased to serve common
interest.143 Rather, the traditional channels of protection through a state,1 44
140 Id. at 218.
141 See notes 99-140 supra and accompanying text.
This conclusion might be reinforced by a comprehensive comparative study of internal
constitutional developments about the world which create transnational expectations
of authority. For development within the United States, see Gordon, note 16 supra.
See also the other works cited in notes 14 and 16 supra.
142 F. GA Ac-Atm~oR, L. Sore, & B. BAvXrE, supra note 8, at 1-5; Garela-Amadorfs
First Report, supra note 8, at 19-203.
143 The disappearance of the notion that states are the only appropriate subjects of
international law need not becloud the facts of effective power that individuals some-
times need the support of their states to secure appropriate remedies against states
and other entities.
For comprehensive and persuasive development of this theme, see Lillich, note 98
supra. See also Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 CoL m. J. T sANsNAT'L L.
415 (1973).
144 Koessler observed that "the gist of the institution of diplomatic protection" lies
"in its remedial aspect rather than in the substantive character of the interest involved."
"It is not," he continues, "because the protecting state feels offended by the wrong
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together with the newly developed procedures under the contemporary
human rights program of claim by individuals, 1 45 would appear to achieve
a cumulative beneficent impact, each reinforcing the other, in the defense
and fulfillment of the human rights of the individual. In recent times,
individuals have in fact gained, for remedy of deprivations, either direct
or derivative access to some transnational arenas of authoritative decision,
such as the UN Commission on Human Rights (through the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities),' 48
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,147 the Euro-
done to one of its nationals, but in order to give the latter a workable substitute for
the inaccessability of an international forum, that the strong arm of the government is
extended to the private interest...." Koessler, supra note 40, at 181.
145 See generally J. C.nm, UN PROTECTION OF Civr. AN Por.rrmcAL RiHTs (1970);
E. IAs, Hnm, iA RIGHTS AND IN-ErNATIONAL ACTIoN (1970); M. MosKowrrz, INTER-
NATIONAL CONCEmR wrrIH H iA. RIGHTS (1974); C. NORGAARD, TmR PosrrioN OF THE
INDIVIDUAL Uq LNEmNATIONAL LAw (1962); A. ROBERTSON, HuitAN RIGHTS IN THE
Wors.D (1972); UrTu NATIONS, UNTrED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FmiLD oF HUMrA
IGHTS, UN Doc. ST/HR/2 (1974); V. VAN Dx-KE, HUmAN BiGrrrs, THE UNrED STATES,
AND WoRLD Coxxu=Nrrv 159-254 (1970); J. Jefferies, The Individual and International
Law, 1954 (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School); Capotorti, The Inter-
national Measures of Implementation Included in the Covenants of Human Rights, in
ItNTERNAPTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RicTs 131-48 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds.
1968); Golsong, Implementation of International Protection of Human Rights, 110
HAGUE RECUEIL DES Cotrs 7 (1963); Humphrey, The International Law of Human
Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw A D Ormm ESSAYS 75-105 (M. Bos ed. 1973); Korey, The Key to Human Rights
Implementation, 570 IN'L CONCIIATION (Nov. 1968); Schwelb, Civil and Political
Rights: The International Measures of Implementation, 62 AJIL 827 (1968); Schwelb,
Notes on the Early Legislative History of the Measures of Implementation of the
Human Rights Covenants, in MELANGES OFRMTS A POLYS MoNDMINos 270-89 (1968).
146 See L. Soiw & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HtXrAN RIGHTS
739-856 (1973); UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN THE FIE.o OF HuiAN BIGHTs, supra
note 145, at 177-84; Carey, Progress on Human Rights at the UN, 66 AJIL 107
(1972); Cassese, The Admissibility of Communications to the UN on Human Rights
Violations, 5 HmmA x RIGHTS J. 375 (1972); Hoare, The UN Commission on Human
Rights, in THE LTERwATIONAL PROTECTION OF HumA._s RIGHrs 59-98 (E. Luard ed.
1967); Humphrey, The Right of Petition in the UN, 4 Hvl N BIGHTs J. 463 (1971);
Humnphrey, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights and its Parent Body, in
1 Ru x CAssN AMICORUM DiScInuLoRu'mQUE LIBER 108-13 (1969); Newman, The
New U.N. Procedures for Human Rights Complaints: Reform, Status Quo, or Chambers
of Horroi?, in Hearings on International Protection of Human Rights Before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. of
Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 715-22 (1974); Schwelb, Complaints by in-
dividuals to the Commission on Human Rights: 25 years of an uphill struggle (1947-
1971), in THE CnHAGING INTErmATIONAL ConxamsrN= 119-39 (C. Boasson & M.
Nurock eds. 1973); Van Boven, The United Nations Commission on Human Rights
and Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 15 NED -n- s TrjDscH-
nir VooR LNERNA-TIONAAL RECHT 374 (1968).
14 7The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination provides for individual petitions in Article 14, the first paragraph of which
reads as follows:
A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of
individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State
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pean Commission on Human Rights,; 148 and the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights,149 and such access promises to increase significantly
in the future, especially as the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights comes into operation.150 Yet the
prospect of further direct access by-individuals to authoritative arenas,
though encouraging, remains far from adequate. As long as states remain
the most important and most effective participants in transnational proc-
Party of any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall
be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made
such a declaration.
UN HuAN RIGHTS INSTUMENTS, supra note 100, at 23, 27. The competence of
the Committee regarding individual petitions is made operative "only when at least
ten States Parties" have made the requisite declarations of acceptance. Art. 14 (9),
id. at 28. This condition has to date not been fulfilled.
See The Protection of Respect and Human Rights, supra note 2, at 1082-86. See
also N. LEaNER THE UN CONVENTION O, TH ELIMINATiON OF ALL FoAMs OF RACIAL
DISCRImNATiON 83-99 (1970); Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and
Genocide: An Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
1 DENVER J. IN'L L. & PoLicy 29, 58-64 (1971); Schwelb, supra note 125, at 1031-
59.
148 See European Convention on Human Rights, Arts. 2,5-32; BAsIC DoCUMENTS,
supra note 127, at 132-34.
See also R. BEDDAwD, HuMAN RIGirS AzD EUnOPE 50-85 (1973); F. CASTBnO, Tim,
ETROPEAN CoNvmmNo o HuMAN RIGHTs 34-67 (1974); CoUNcm OF EUROPE, Tim
EuROPEAN CONVEMON ON HUMAN RiGaTs 11-16 (1968); A. DEL Russo, INTn-
NATiONAL PRoTEcIoN OF HUMAN RIGHTs 68-121 (1971); J. FAWCETT, supra note 129,
at 277-322; C. MonrussoN, THE DEVELOPIncG EUROPEAN LAW OF HUMsAN RIGHTS 60-
98 (1967); A. ROBERTsON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EURoPE 49-74 (1963); A. ROBERTSON',
supra note 145, at 51-110; L. Sonrw & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 146, at 1008-50,
1091-99; G. Wzre, THE EUroPEAN CONVENTIMON ON HuiAN RIGrrs 90-143 (1963);
Golsong, The Control Machinery of the European Convention on Human Rights, in
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTON ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 99, at 38-69; McNulty,
The Operation and Effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights, 3
U. SAN FRANcIscO L. REv. 228 (1969); McNulty's Stock-Taking 1974, note 128 supra;
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esses of decision, espousal of claims by states for deprivations suffered by
individuals would appear indispensable to full protection. Remedy through
claim by a protecting state and through individual petition need not be
mutually incompatible; they can be made to reinforce each other for the
better defense and fulfillment of the human rights of the individual51-
IV.
TIE FuTmi OF PROTEMCION
The future development of the world community will provide the context
the characteristics of which are decisive for the conception of an alien and
therefore for all prescriptions that relate to "protection" or "discrimination."
In political terms an alien is an outsider, a nonmember of the state whose
policies are under consideration. As we have seen, it has long been re-
garded as permissible for state policy to erect certain barriers against non-
members. At the same time various limitations have been applied to dis-
criminatory activity. Sharply contrasting policies and factual circumstances
have tended to sustain ambiguities of legal doctrine in regard to aliens. In
preceding sections we have demonstrated how these ambiguities can be
coped with on behalf of preferred policy. Questions remain about the
probable future interplay of fact and doctrine in this significant area.
If we extend current trends into the future the prediction is warranted
that after an interval in which the protection of aliens remains in jeopardy,
the direction of evolution will change as many conditioning factors that
sustain discrimination are weakened. We refer, for example, to the jeop-
ardy in which individuals and corporations often find themselves in former
colonial countries. Up to this time policies of discrimination have not
exhausted the reservoirs of resentment that accumulated during the period
of colonial subordination and of post-colonial disappointment with the im-
mediate fruits of independence. The initiative will continue to be taken
by members of the national elite who are seeking to supplant alien interests
in order to consolidate control by local capitalists. Where socialist ideology
is strong, the active mobilizers of anti-alien sentiment are typically recruited
from among the political elites whose members are determined to do away
with and to preclude outside competition for effective control of national re-
sources. Whether the anti-alien leaders are entirely political, or constitute
a coalition of political and economic forces, their strategy will be to keep
251 Cf. McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, supra note 1, at 993-98.
It has often been alleged, perhaps with some accuracy, that the doctrine of respon-
sibility of states has been abused. Insofar as these complaints are appropriately di-
rected to the use of force as a means of self-help ("the gunboat policy"), they may
be justified. Insofar as they relate to third-party decisionmaking, they have no
validity. In the words of Lillich: "While it is true that 'the ideas of justice and fair
dealing incorporated in the accepted norms of conduct for European nations were
carried over into the wider sphere of the international society of the nineteenth century,'
there is no need to apologize for attempting to establish a universal consensus behind
justice and fair dealing." Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights, 53 IowA L. REv. 325, 327-28 (1967).
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alive among the rank and file of the population sentiments that enabled
the anti-imperialist, pro-independence movement to succeed.
As time passes many changes are likely to occur in the strength of the
factors that support extremist measures against aliens. It will be increas-
ingly evident to widening circles of leaders and the led that an unlimited
anti-alien policy does not yield net advantages; that, in fact, in their own
history there never was a totally anti-alien policy. Concessions are typ-
ically made at successive stages of an independence movement to foreign
interests from which political, economic, and other forms of assistance were
(and are) sought. These adjustments may be made to rival socialist or
liberal, totalitarian or moderate, blocs. The stronger powers among former
colonies also find themselves granting assistance to weaker members of the
successor communities and insisting that reciprocal obligations be lived up
to. In this way they reinstate the confrontations that originally led the
stronger states to follow a policy inspired by Vattel (which, of course, they
did not need to learn from a scholar). If the stronger among the successor
powers share a common ideological orientation, synonyms will be used in
order to avoid stigmatizing a fellow ideologist as an "alien." Since the
external relations of every successor power are not likely to be entirely re-
stricted to an ideological bloc, situations can be expected to arise in which
the traditional language of international law will seem more effective than
alternatives.
Many occasions for advancing claims on behalf of aliens will be but
trivially related to economic affairs. The emerging code of human rights
provides a set of standards that apply to every sector of human interaction.
If we postulate that global connections will continue to gain intensity,
emerging networks of association will cover more people, more localities,
and more pluralization. To an increasing extent the protection of aliens
will be taken for granted.
If we accept the scenario of accelerating interdependence, we must be
prepared for a zig-zag evolution of policies toward nonmembers of the
principal bodies politic. A key problem is whether the major political
divisions of the globe will continue to be perceived by enough influential
members as a sufficiently important means by which net advantages can
be obtained at the expense of nonmembers. It is reasonable to assume that
coalitions will arise which expect to reap benefits from governmental pol-
icies that impose substantial deprivations on nonmembers. Such expecta-
tion will take advantage of the reappearance of conditioning factors that
have fostered these results in the past. Lurking in the background of
individuals who have not been socialized to identify fully with the world
community is "fear of the stranger"; and this is often focused on non-
members of the principal body politic (the state). From one situation to
the other an "alien" may be stigmatized with every identifying symbol that
has a negative cathexis (racial, religious, and so on). Recent environ-
mental circumstances may have contributed to the level of unrest generated
by realized or anticipated value deprivations (political, economic, and so
on). Impulses that contribute to unrest are available for displacement on
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such public targets as aliens. In our interactive world it is to be assumed that
counterpolicies will be mobilized on behalf of the alien. In consequence,
extremes of policy may be mitigated while expectations are strengthened
that the prescriptive code that requires the protection of aliens is, indeed,
enforcible. Barring drastic contingencies, the probability is that the code
of human rights will be progressively refined in harmony with the policies
necessary to protect aliens as full members of the world community.
